


ANGOLA IN FLAMES

By the same Author
Revolution in Africa

ANGOLA IN FLAMES

by
K. MADHU PANIKKAR

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ANGOLA IN FLAMES

INTRODUCTION

I

AFRICA is a land of surprises. From the time of Pliny, the Roman writer, it has been springing surprises on the rest of the world. Today, Africa is casting her slowly lengthening shadows over Europe. Already two democratic régimes have been overthrown by armies based on Africa. In Belgium the withdrawal from the Congo led not only to a political crisis, but also to an economic one. In Britain the attitude towards Africa is the divisive factor between a conservative and a liberal today. Africa appears to be making up in a decade an age-long neglect.

What is the reason for this all pervasiveness? The emergence of the former colonial territories in Asia to nationhood created in the United Nations a bloc which is pledged to the liberation of colonies elsewhere. The emphasis on human rights and human dignity, made the holding down of whole people in slavery an indefensible proposition. The ideas of the French Revolution—Liberty, Fraternity and Equality—have penetrated into Africa; they are accompanied by the newer modes of thought on economic organization and economic equality which

the Russian Revolution introduced. In Africa, these ideas, belonging to two different epochs came together; the African has to face challenges which other societies faced at widely separated periods. He, however, realises that the economic basis cannot be changed unless political power has been consolidated. Nkrumah expressed this when he declared "seek ye first the political kingdom and the rest will follow."

These new ideas, which swept the African continent, have been called "a wind of change." Britain and France were quick to realise that in the second half of the twentieth century it was no longer possible to hold nations in bondage. They adjusted themselves to the changes: they have tried to preserve their economic interests in the newly independent countries by handing over power to groups of leaders who had imbued their traditions, their views on political morality and their administrative methods. In the Congo, the Belgians were slow to read the writing on the wall; the Abako-inspired rioting in Leopoldville compelled them to reluctantly hand over power to the Africans. But while doing so, they were sure that the Congolese—whom they had deprived of all education and who had neither political organization nor administrative experience—would recall them as technicians and experts. Their withdrawal was, therefore, only half-hearted. In Katanga—where the giant mining corporation, the "Union Minière du Haut Katanga" is the real ruling power—foreign groups worked actively to help Katanga secede from the rest of the Congo. To a large extent, this conspiracy succeeded, and its success, as we shall see in a later section, was

to influence deeply all the countries which are to the south of the Congo.

There is one country which is completely cut off from the current of events in the world—Portugal. She, however, fully knows that the other countries are making fateful decisions, but merely holds that the white people except herself, Southern Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, and the colons of Algeria are out of step. It is in these territories, according to Salazar, that the real drama of our times—the defence of European values in the savage continent—is taking place. The so-called “wind of change,” Salazar pointed out, is merely a phrase to avoid moral responsibilities. Portugal has no intention of abandoning her responsibilities, she is fully conscious that it is a sacred mission which God had commanded her to carry out to convert the heathen whether in the State of India, in Macao (why not the State of China ?), in the forests of the Congo or on the tablelands of Angola. She will not abandon this whatever others may do, for she had been led into Africa not by any sordid idea of gain, but by high ideals. These ideals are in the process of being realised; the jeremiads of self-seekers are not going to deter the Lusitanians from doing their duty.

Portugal, Salazar argues, was first in the field of African exploration. This is, of course, broadly speaking true—if we leave out the Italian adventurers who penetrated the Sahara and even reached Timbuctoo or forget adventures like the Indian expedition of the Vivaldi brothers. Though challenged by the French, Portuguese primacy in opening up the sea route

from Europe is generally accepted. But what is forgotten is that among the expert cartographers, shipwroughts and technicians whom Dom Henry gathered together at Sagres, the majority were Italians.

One must not underestimate Dom Henry. In a country which has singularly failed to produce great men, Henry the Navigator was a truly remarkable figure. At Sagres, he coordinated the activities of some of the most skilled technicians of his age; collected every bit of information about Africa, and organised expeditions which slowly and steadily pressed down south. Finally, Cape Nun—the ultimate point in European bigotry where the dark sea began and men who crossed it changed their colour—was crossed without any fatal effect. In 1482, Diego Cam reached modern Angola, in 1488 the Cape of Good Hope was rounded and in 1497 Vasco da Gama entered the Mozambique channel. Henry had died some years before but Vasco da Gama was merely the executor of a plan, which the prince had designed.

The issue is not an academic one; the rulers of Portugal have utilised Dom Henry to provide them with a new mystique. Speaking at the Colonial Governor's Conference in 1933, Salazar declared: "I have in mind now the great old figures of Portuguese colonization. They pass back and forth in my memory, these men of yesterday and those of today, the soldiers and administrators of the public trust in Africa and the East. . . ." The Minister of Colonies Armindo Monteiro declared, "It is often said, that we Portuguese have the vice of history. Some even

say that we take refuge in the past to compensate for the smallness of the present—thus obeying the doleful law of Empire corroded by stagnation and decadence. In Portugal, however, we now feel that we are so much the heirs of a great tradition that the generation of today is entitled to invoke the past not as a remembrance of dead things, but as a source of inspiration for the future.”

Is it as an inspiration for the future that the New State has really built up the past? In order to examine this, it is necessary, therefore, to have an idea of the position which Portugal holds in the world today and that which she held when she was the dominant maritime power. In the days of her greatness Portugal had certain great advantages. She had benefited from the Moorish conquest; the proximity of the Moors, was an incentive—for they were not only hereditary enemies but also infidels—to wage a continuous war. She had become independent in the twelfth century, when large parts of Spain were still under Moorish domination. The other states of Western Europe, notably France, the German and Italian states had not consolidated their power. France, the largest and most powerful of them, was still a feudal monarchy. Portugal, because of its small size, enjoyed a unity which the other states lacked. The result was that she was first in the field of maritime exploration but it would be wrong to say that she established an empire. She held certain ports on the coast, for example, Goa and Cochin in India, from where she controlled the export trade. A similar pattern existed in Africa. The King of Portugal rightly called himself, “the

Lord of Commerce." He used his naval superiority for capturing the external trade of other countries.

The Portuguese claim that she had been an imperial power in Africa, for over 500 years, and that Angola and Mozambique have belonged to her for this period is one of those myths which Portugal has spread about herself. The facts are completely at variance with this fable. As Mousinho de Albuquerque, one of the heroes of Portuguese colonial history, wrote of Mozambique in the 1890's:

"We controlled the capital of the province on the island of Moçambique; we also controlled the entire district of Inhambane; we occupied Lourenço Marques, and exercised a more nominal than effective suzerainty in the surrounding lands ruled by chiefs who were vassals of the crown; we had forts at various points in the province—Sofala, Tete, Sena, Quelimane, Ibo, Tungue, and a few more. This was the extent to which were reduced our royal domains in Portuguese East Africa; in the rest of our possessions in this part of Africa we had no authority of any kind."¹ In Angola, the position was slightly worse. Civil administration was established only in 1911; Portugal till then was engaged in a pacification campaign.

It is quite true that the Portuguese have been on the continent for over five hundred years, but till the end of the nineteenth century, they were confined to the coast. They did indeed claim the whole of the Congo, Nyasaland, and the coast of Kenya,

¹Quoted in Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 230.

but none of the European powers took her claims seriously. The conference of Berlin treated her claims on the Congo in a most contemptuous fashion; it, however, recognised her claims on Angola and Mozambique. This was because Portugal was extremely fortunate to possess in Serpa Pinto, Mousinho de Albuquerque and others, men who realised that the only way to justify her claims as an African power was to consolidate her hold on some part of Africa, by opening up the interior, and forcing the local tribes by military conquest to recognise Portuguese suzerainty.

Even her conquests and consolidation did not convince the other European powers. Her oldest ally Britain was willing to partition Portuguese possessions with Germany. The treaty of Windsor was not the last British attempt; even as late as 1913 the Portuguese colonies were offered as compensation to Germany. Nor was the old alliance—the English alliance with Portugal dates from the fourteenth century—ever taken seriously by Britain. In 1601, it is true that Britain undertook to defend Portuguese territories, but that was for acquiring Bombay, and it did not stop Britain from issuing an ultimatum to her ally in 1890. The British interest in Portugal was primarily commercial, in the days of Portuguese greatness she provided a considerable market. The Portuguese were anxious to retain British goodwill for the English preferred to drink Port wine and suffer from gout rather than help France by drinking French wines. Portuguese claims in Africa therefore were neither accepted by her friends nor by her foes. They took over territories, which according to Portugal were her protectorates.

The second basis on which Portugal's claim rests is the famous Papal Bull. The Government of Portugal had the temerity to argue that, since the Pope had divided the world between the Portuguese and the Spanish crowns, her rights in Goa cannot be questioned. Salazar who with impunity exiles Bishops, and arrests Catholic priests has the audacity to advance this kind of argument to the government of a country which Portugal considers as heathen. Not even a good Catholic would accept his claims. His Most Christian Majesty of France François I wanted to see the testament of Adam to know whether he was really excluded. He was unwilling to accept the partition because he found that the Sun shines as brightly for him, as for the Kings of Portugal and Spain, and decided that the Pope was not really competent to judge the matter. He permitted his merchant adventurers to trade on the west-coast of Africa; Jean Ango and other good Frenchmen and good Catholics not only went into this Portuguese preserve but raided Portuguese ships off Cape Verde. Most important of all, Portugal herself refused to accept the Papal Bull; the partition of the world was carried out between the plenipotentiaries of the two Iberian powers. The treaty of Tordesillas was the result, and the Pope in another Bull merely confirmed this.

Portugal, it has been pointed out, emphasises her role in Africa. The emphasis has been on the voyages of discovery organised by Dom Henry, but she should not really forget the strange adventure of Sebastian the African. Sebastian, a King of Portugal during the sixteenth century decided that as a Christian

crusader it was his duty to conquer the Kingdom of Morocco. He assembled a large army, in which adventurers from every European country participated; the blessing of the Pope increased the zeal of the crusaders. However, at el Ksar, the issue was decided in a single afternoon. Sebastian suffered a crushing defeat and was killed on the battlefield. The result of this attempt to conquer an African State was that Portugal lost her independence.

The ghost of Henry the Navigator seems to haunt the Portuguese colonialists; Salazar would do well to remember the fate of Sebastian. Would not the attempt to hold Africa by force lead to a second el Ksar ?

II

But, what of Portugal herself ? Has she maintained her primacy ? Is she among the industrially advanced states of today, does her science and technology compare with those of the advanced countries; can she put forward the claim that her material superiority gives her if not the right at least the force to maintain her position as a colonial power ? She is the most backward country of Europe today. Her standard of living and the rate of literacy is the lowest—if Salazar by some chance divided the Portuguese of the metropolitan territory into civilized and non-civilized, at least 30 per cent of the population would fail to pass the test—infantile mortality rate on the other hand the highest in Europe. She has practically no industry, more than 50 per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture.

Portuguese economy is dominated by a few families

who exploit the natural resources of Portugal in collaboration with foreign capitalists. Thus in the Petroleum industry, the S.C.A.O.R., in which the major interest is held by a French firm but with Portuguese government participation to the extent of 33 per cent, has a virtual monopoly. It is entitled to supply 80 per cent of the requirement of the Overseas Provinces, as well as half the domestic consumption. In Wolfram the main producer is a British company, the only other producer is a French firm. In Pyrites one British and two Belgian companies dominate; in the state quarries too, the British have large share. A Portuguese company with French associates manufactures sluice gates for dams. A Belgian company with Portuguese associates manufactures electric locomotives; the cable factory and the telephone factory are British. And an American firm produces telecommunication equipment, French and Dutch firms make electric bulbs; the tyre factory is a subsidiary of General Tyres. The only major Portuguese industrial concern is the Companhia União Fabril, which manufactures fertilisers, copper sulphate and other chemicals, vegetable oils, soap, jute, builds ships, owns a shipping line, a bank and copper mines in Angola.

Portugal is thus the perfect example of a fossilised society; she has changed little and that for the worst. She remains unaffected by the great revolutions which ushered in the primacy of Europe. Yet, backwardness has not meant that she has been politically stable. Between the abdication of King Charles in 1903 and the army *coup d'état* which brought Salazar into power, there have been eight

Presidents, 48 governments and 20 revolutions. Portugal even toyed with the idea of asking the League of Nations to administer the country in order to achieve stability.

Her recent history holds no glimmer of hope and her economic plight is even worse. Britain's protectorate in Europe, she is in many ways herself a colonial country. All the public utilities in Lisbon—transport and the telephone system—are owned by British companies. Portugal's main exports to other European countries are raw materials, the two major exports being cork and Port wine. Only two towns, Lisbon and Oporto, have populations of over 100,000. She has no industry and does not therefore have a sufficient number of trained people with technical knowledge of modern industrial construction. Even in Portugal, the construction of shipyards, of a steel industry and other major industrial projects are carried out by foreign firms.

Portugal, therefore, lacks any technical superiority over Africa. Even her methods of agriculture are not advanced, the emigrant to Angola soon lapses into Angolan standards. The economic policy adopted by Salazar perhaps emphasised the weaknesses of the Portuguese economy. An orthodox economist, he decided that a balanced budget is the hallmark of a healthy economy, his deflationist measures won the approval of the bankers. The *escudo*³ became one of *the strong currencies of Europe, where it ranked with the Swiss franc and the Swedish kroner*. The chief victims of Salazar's measures were the Portuguese

³Escudo is a unit of the Portuguese currency. Its value in Indian currency is about 17 nP.

people and the Portuguese economy. Ever since he came to power, the standard of living of the working classes has fallen considerably. The Portuguese economy remains aenemic; capital formation and investment remain markedly low.

Portugal is thus suffering from the evils of a colonial economy. Her empire cannot therefore be compared to the modern empires of Britain, France or Belgium. They had conquered tropical areas mainly to secure a market for their goods and raw materials for their industry. Being highly industrialised states they required the raw materials and mineral resources which the tropical world possessed. The surplus capital from Europe flowed into these countries and it led to the development of resources required by the metropolitan economy. It is true that the development was lopsided but at the same time it must be remembered that it did develop the natural resources of the area. Second, since the primary object of acquiring a colony was to get a preferential market, it was necessary to develop a money economy. Colonialism—the modern variety of it—broke the stagnant village societies, and drew them by a cash nexus into the world economy. Marx, in a classical passage on the effects of British conquest of India, drew particular attention to this aspect of colonialism. Even more important is the fact that the colonial powers were among the most advanced nations. They had a surplus of capital and technical skill. They were anxious to find avenues of employment for both. The colonial territories were therefore endowed with harbours and railways to the great profit of the capitalists in the metropolitan territories.

Investment in railways became profitable and concession hunting became one of the activities of international monopolies. But, the colonies provided an exclusive market. France and Britain, for example, during the postwar period, spent large amounts of money on public works in their colonies; most of this expenditure went into the coffers of national firms. Moreover, it provided an important market for some sectors of the economy, important not because of its size, but because it was an extension of the home market. Colonial development was therefore linked to national economic interest. But, once national consciousness developed, these countries, because of their surplus capital and technical skill, could withdraw from their former colonial territories and attempt to maintain by means of aids and loans their economic links. Their technical skill and industrial "know-how," would, they realised, be required by the developing countries; the exports to the former colonial territories could be increased though their nature would have to be changed. Machinery and capital goods would replace consumer goods and luxury items. Thus if the country was willing to make adjustments, the end of colonialism need not necessarily lead to a lowering of the standard of life in the metropolitan territory. It may on the contrary lead to a higher standard of living.

Would this be true in the case of Portugal? She is, as we have discussed earlier, short of capital. Her industries are owned and run by foreigners. Most of the vital sectors of the economy are dominated by British, French and Belgian capital. Foreign capital moreover is playing an increasingly important role

in Portugal's economy. Recently Germany and the United States have made a strong attempt to enter the Portuguese market. The newly established steel mill, for example, has been set up by a consortium of German and Belgian firms; the Armstrong Cork Company of the United States has acquired a vital interest in the cork industry.

Even more important than the lack of capital is the lack of technical skill; Portugal has depended on foreign personnel for setting up her industries. The widening and deepening of harbours and the construction of factories, have been done by foreign firms. Portugal therefore is not in a position to help Angola or Mozambique, and we shall show in later chapters that she is excessively dependent on foreigners. Her claims that her presence is required in Africa because the African would not be able to manage the existing industries are therefore baseless. The Portuguese are singularly lacking in technical skill; with independence Angola and Mozambique would be able to choose their technical advisers from people who are better qualified.

What does then Portugal mean by the phrase upholding the white man's civilization in Africa? Whatever she means, it is certainly not the material achievement of the West, to which her contribution has been negligible. It is certainly not the building up of the institutional framework, for she herself lacks those institutions which one is apt to associate with the West. No, the white man's civilization, of which Portugal with South Africa is the self-appointed defender is not the Western civilization with which we are familiar. The achievements of the French

and the Russian Revolutions as well as the Industrial Revolution with which mankind associates Western civilization is anathema to Salazar. Portugal has not yet had an industrial revolution. The industries—what little there is—are run either as individual concerns or as guilds. The major industrial concerns are owned by foreigners: the result is that Portuguese imperialism is pre-capitalist. It is necessary to emphasise the pre-capitalist nature of Portuguese society for, without keeping this constantly in mind, the archaic nature of Portuguese labour and commercial policies cannot be understood.

III

In order to understand the importance of the Portuguese possessions in Africa it is necessary to put them in their geographical setting. Mozambique lies to the south of Tanganyika, it has Nyasaland, Rhodesia and South Africa as its neighbours. Its two harbours, Lourenço Marques and Beira are the ports for Natal and Southern Rhodesia, respectively.

Angola borders on the Trust territory of South West Africa, Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. Its major railway, the Benguela Railway, is owned by a predominantly British concern—The Tanganyika Concessions. This firm founded by Robert Williams, a British mining engineer, has great influence in the present-day politics of Southern Africa. It is a shareholder in the Union Minière du Haut Katanga which, as we know today, has played an important part in the secession of the Katanga. In Angola, it is a major shareholder in the Benguela

railway, in fact the line was built to transport the copper of Katanga. Though, chronologically, this is not correct—the Benguela concession was negotiated in 1902 and the Katanga mines were in operation only in 1905—the existence of the deposits were known, and Williams' idea was to link the railway construction with mineral production. Today it is through the port of Lobito that Katanga exports her copper.

The Benguela Railway is one of the most romantic railways in the world. It is part of a transAfrican system which links Lobito in Angola with Beira in Mozambique. But it does not do it directly, for it goes north for two thousand km. to Elizabethville. Elizabethville in turn is connected to the Northern Rhodesian railway system. Thus the overland route linking the two Portuguese colonies in Africa is in many ways a political watershed; it is the outer rampart of white civilization in Southern Africa.

This obviously is the reason why Katanga has assumed such critical importance for the West. The overthrow of Tshombe, and the consolidation of the authority of Leopoldville over Katanga, would probably deprive them of copper. Though a vital mineral, copper is not in short supply. The Central African Federation has enormous reserves. Moreover, economic ties could have continued with the Congo as with other newly independent states. Thus, there are some other interests involved, which have led the Western alliance to treat the whole of this area as a vital one. This can perhaps be realised best by examining the British policy in Rhodesia.

Britain has since the early fifties been slowly withdrawing from her African territories. This is true, not only of what are considered as purely African territories like Nigeria and Ghana, but also of territories which were once considered to be areas of settlement. Kenya, for example, was once thought of as the nucleus of a new East African Dominion, but today it has been recognised as an African country. In Central Africa a different policy has been pursued; Dr Banda was bludgeoned into the federation. Northern Rhodesia despite Mr Kaunda's resounding protests is under the iron heels of the white supremacists at Salisbury. Macleod, who has been called the outstanding Colonial Secretary of the century, has notwithstanding all his professions of liberalism increased the powers of the small and arrogant minority which holds power in Salisbury.

Katanga, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies are all closely linked. It is important to bear this in mind. The late Field Marshal Smuts once remarked that the frontiers of the Union are on the Congo. In only one sense is this true. South of the Congo, begin the areas of European settlement. In the Congo alone, immediately after independence there were over 100,000 white settlers, concentrated mostly in Kivu and Katanga. The Highlands of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola have large white settler populations. The Congo is therefore of vital interest, if the white entrenched interests south of Limpopo are to remain unaffected.

In 1960 the Belgians became convinced that their position in the Congo in the face of the massive opposition from the people was untenable and even.

army could not help the Belgian to stay on. They, therefore, decided to withdraw. This withdrawal caused a great stir throughout the southern part of the continent. But both Verwoed and Salazar have made it clear that they did not approve of the policy of scuttle, and have every intention to stay.

In many ways the Boer mind and the Portuguese mind work in a strikingly similar manner. Both live in a long forgotten age—to use Duffy's picturesque expression—in the age of the caravel and the ox cart. Both have a thorough contempt for the African: a fear that if there is the slightest loosening of control, the floodgates will be opened. The Portuguese with characteristic hypocrisy talk of their soul; it is rather the fear that if the African is not suppressed there would be no hope for the white settlers in a black continent that makes both the Boer and the Portuguese adopt the most savage measures.

Yet, the Portuguese is suspicious of the Boer and the Afrikaner does not consider the Portuguese to be a true white. There is contempt on both sides; both realise that the policy the other pursues is fatal to the maintenance of white supremacy. United only by their common dislike of African and of European values, they subordinate their contempt for each other in order to keep the African out. Such an alliance, of course, has not the power to stop the African from achieving his freedom.

They have made their intentions clear to every one; only a military defeat will make them leave Africa. Salazar and the other Portuguese ministers repeatedly declare that Portugal intends to stay. Angola, they argue, had been colonised by them before

Colombus discovered America; they therefore have as much right to Angola or Mozambique as any African. Just because they happen to be whites there is no reason to believe that they are not Africans. Erasmus was speaking for all the Southern settlers, when he declared, that the whites of the South had no intention of leaving the continent. Verwoed even dreamt of forming a massive white bloc in the South, which would serve as a barrier to the rising black menace. This white bloc is to consist of the Union, the Rhodesias and the Portuguese colonies. Verwoed expects that now that Tanganyika has become independent an "Angolan type invasion" would take place in Mozambique, and that South Africa would have to face black masses on another flank. He has, therefore, already undertaken some precautionary measures. There have been joint Union and Rhodesian air exercises; over 3,000 Union troops had their training in bush warfare on the Transvaal-Mozambique frontier, there have been a large number of hush-hush military missions from the Union and Rhodesia to the Portuguese colonies and vice-versa.

It is in the light of these that Welensky's moves in the Katanga have to be discussed. If Katanga remains in the Congo, or becomes an anti-colonial power, both South Africa and Rhodesia would feel that their security is in danger. Mozambique would have no through connection with Angola: the railway in Katanga is the vital link joining the two Overseas Provinces. Northern Rhodesia could not be held and extreme pressure would be applied on Mozambique. The strategy, on which the Union has since the days

of Smuts based her defence would become worthless.

To a certain extent the white powers are taking precautionary measures. This can best be seen in the policy of railway construction. Angolan and Mozambique railways are being extended to the Rhodesian frontier. New roads are linking up these territories to Rhodesia and South Africa. Enormous amount of money is being expended to develop the mineral resources, and every inducement is being offered to the settlers. Portugal is even attempting to induce the settlers who are murdering the Angolans to settle in that country. That would indeed be a Cromwellian solution.

What exactly are the interests of Britain and the United States of America in all this? First, the major portion of British and American investment in Africa have been in these territories. Secondly, to both Britain and the USA, these territories are of vast strategic interests. Lourenço Marques and Beira are two of the most important ports in Southern Africa. They are capable of handling the largest ships. With the facilities which these ports offer, and the growing industrial strength of the Union, the USA and Britain hope to dominate the Arabian Sea. It is well to remember that Aden is still in British hands, and that the northern portion of the Arabian Sea would be controlled from there. On the west, the Cape Verde islands, and the Angolan and South African ports would give them complete command over the South Atlantic. No wonder the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has become heavily involved in the Katanga operations and the

Angolan war of liberation! The constant supply of arms from every NATO country—with the honourable exception of Norway—to Portugal, has made the war of liberation in Angola, a war against the Atlantic powers. To most people, Angola has become the struggle of an African people against European neo-colonialism.

Nor must one leave out the bogey of Communism. Communism, says Salazar, is the main enemy. Its object, according to him, is to weaken the Iberian bloc, which is the true bastion of Western civilization. But even Salazar's most fervent admirer would find it hard not to suppress a smile at this masterly overstatement: that the reason why the Angolans have risen in revolt is because Khrushchev has been impressed by the great importance of the Iberian peninsula as a bastion of the NATO. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, however, appealed to her protector Britain "for a better understanding in Britain of Portugal's difficulties in Africa and of the great importance of Angola to the West."

Britain, whose expertise in diplomatic tight rope walking is unrivalled, found Portugal's demand embarrassing. But, she could not really let down a friend—particularly one in whose African colonies British investors had invested so heavily. She therefore decided to compromise, failing to realise that by doing so she compromised herself. Britain did not go through with the joint exercises she had planned with Portugal, but made it clear that she would supply Portugal with all the arms that she required, and allowed *H.M.S. Leopard* to visit Angola. The NATO, thus, became in the eyes of the uncom-

mitted nations of the world, an unholy alliance which merely used the bogey of communism to suppress nationalist movements in the colonial world.

Even more interesting, as an illustration of the British attitude to Portugal, was the invitation extended to the Portuguese Minister to open the Fort Jesus Museum in Mombasa. This blatant step was a slap in the face of the African opposition and was done against the wishes of the entire African population. Britain's attitude revealed that whatever she might say about the multi-racial commonwealth, where Angola and Mozambique are concerned, Portugal rather than Africa has been the choice of the British Government.

IV

In January 1961 the steamship *Santa Maria* belonging to the Colonial Maritime Company of Portugal was seized by a group of adventurers led by Captain Galvao. Their object, it appeared, was to take it to west Africa and land as near to Angola or Guinea as possible and from there to conduct an invasion of Portuguese territory. Galvao hoped that if he was able to get a foothold in Angola—he had served in Angola as an administrator and had many supporters there—he would be able to win over the settlers.

The *Santa Maria* revived the days of piracy, the Portuguese declared Galvao to be a pirate and sent ships to intercept the *Santa Maria*. But they did not trust the crew, Spanish ships accompanied the Portuguese. The world refused to accept the Portuguese version of the story; the United States, however,

was unwilling to let the *Santa Maria* proceed to Africa. The reasons for this are not clear. It is true that the boat counted many Americans among its passengers, and one can understand why American ships followed her—to see that no harm came to them. But they did more than this: they persuaded Galvao to proceed to Recife in Brazil rather than Dakar in Africa. Why did Galvao choose the former alternative? His sudden turn-round emphasised that the Portuguese opposition to Salazar, though it would do away with the tyrannical régime, has no intention of letting the overseas territories become independent. Galvao's main supporters are the discontented settlers; the Africans have only a choice between two evils—naturally they chose to fight for their freedom.

The results of Galvao's choice could have been foretold. While Brazil gave asylum to him and his companions, the *Santa Maria* had to be handed over to its Portuguese owners. Galvao was refused a visa to enter the United States when an American Society invited him, the reason given being that while he had been in prison proceedings for bankruptcy were taken up against him and that he had been declared bankrupt. He was, recently, on his way to Sweden, refused permission to enter Britain, and was forced to leave by the next plane. Thus, Britain which has always boasted that it was a refuge for those persecuted for their political convictions, refused to accept Galvao as one. Were Britain and the United States persuing the policy of appeasing Salazar to the extent of abandoning their principles?

Who was this Galvao who caused such a flutter in the chancellories of the world? Was he a Red

revolutionary intent on undermining the established order of 20 per cent dividends, and the principle that the white man will draw the profit, while the black man labours in the mines and the fields? Galvao was certainly not this. He was a die-hard fascist, one of the band of officers who had overthrown the republic in 1926 and brought Salazar to power. He was rewarded with various high offices in the colonies, was governor of Huila and finally became the Senior Inspector of Colonies. His experiences convinced Galvao that Salazar's dictatorship was inefficient and that Portugal was not drawing the full benefit from her colonial possessions. His argument was that in order to exploit the resources of her colonies in a proper fashion it was imperative to stop the export of labour. He pointed out the various defects of the existing system, his object being improvement of the system rather than bringing the African on equal footing with the European. Galvao was never a liberal, he is not one even today, but his report on labour conditions, which was suppressed by the Government, was in many ways a humane document.

The inefficiency of the Portuguese dictatorship led Galvao slowly into opposition. He, however, failed to realise that the monster he had helped to create was in a position to suppress all opposition. It was not as easy to overthrow Salazar as it had been to overthrow the Republic. The notorious security police, the PIDE—which is modelled on the Gestapo—was everywhere. Galvao soon found himself with other conspirators in prison, sentenced to four years imprisonment for endangering the security of

the State. After he had served his term, he was confined to his house, but in the end he escaped and found refuge in Brazil.

There were other opposition groups in Portugal. In 1958 Salazar had graciously allowed an election to take place. Though there were merely three months in which the opposition had freedom to campaign, General Delgado, the opposition candidate—in no way a popular figure, but merely a symbol of opposition to Salazar—was able to win considerable support. Official figures put this at 23 per cent of the vote; in their private conversations the officials say that Delgado got 30 to 40 per cent of the votes, in their cups they admit that Delgado got a majority. In the colonies, the Salazar régime received a major shock: both Angola and Mozambique had come out strongly for Delgado. It is true that Delgado was forced to flee Portugal, but the existence of an opposition to Salazar in Portugal and the colonies gave hope, that in the future at a favourable opportunity, this could be exploited. Galvao, for example, hoped that if he was able to reach Angola or Guinea he could bank on the support of the settlers to overthrow the existing colonial régime.

It is important to remember this: Galvao's object was not to liberate the people of Angola, or the other colonies, but to overthrow the dictatorship of Salazar. None of the leaders of the opposition have ever thought of independence for Angola or Mozambique. The farthest their political vision has gone is a relaxing of the metropolitan control over the overseas provinces, with considerable powers transferred to

the settlers. In short their object is a colony on the model of Southern Rhodesia.

Galvao's main support is amongst the settlers. He could not therefore go against their interests, their interests naturally came into conflict with those of the natives. Galvao, therefore, supports the settler interests and has not said a word about independence for Angola or Mozambique. These are questions which are not of any immediate interest to him. He realises that Portugal could not let go her colonies for her very existence depends on the exploitation of these colonies. Modifications in the present arrangements, in the interest of the settlers, he, like the other leaders of the opposition, is willing to envisage, but not any really fundamental alteration. The African revolt of February 1961 upset his plans as much as it upset Salazar. Galvao found that the settlers are rallying round Salazar in order to exterminate the Africans. His dream, therefore, turned into a nightmare.

Galvao's dramatic seizure of the *Santa Maria* however had one good effect. The Portuguese colonial system had till then been able to exist without attracting any attention. Galvao's action brought the plight of the Portuguese colonies into the spotlight.

V

The nature of the economic dominance exercised by Portugal over her colonies needs to be understood. We have already discussed that Portugal is still living in the medieval age, her trade policies are based on the doctrine that the colonies must be exploited for her benefit. The result has been that the colonies have

been a source of enormous profit to Portugal. She, for example, buys sugar at prices well below the world market price. On all goods imported into the colonies Portugal has a 50 per cent tariff advantage. Goods cannot be imported from other countries unless they cost 15 per cent less than if imported from Portugal. She has adopted various methods of limiting imports to a certain proportion of that imported from Portugal; thus in cotton textiles 75 per cent of the imports has to come from Portugal. In building materials the proportion is 50 per cent. Even more important, Portuguese industry gets protection through administrative action. Import licences are just withheld in certain cases for foreign goods. All foreign exchange is pooled in Lisbon, and made available for only those imports which are sanctioned by the authorities in Lisbon. Yet, most of the foreign exchange is earned by the colonies. Mozambique and Angola contributed 25 per cent of the total revenue of Portugal to the national exchequer. While the deficit in the balance of trade of Portugal in 1959 was 4.5 million, the colonies had a favourable balance and hence the net deficit was only 1.5 million escudos.

There is no freedom for the colonial importer. He must register with the Board of Foreign Trade of the colony for import permits are granted only to registered importers. Registration, however, does not automatically lead to the granting of licences. The Economic Coordination Council must approve of the imports as really necessary for the colony before they are granted. The Board of Foreign Trade, moreover, controls all exports from Angola except coffee,

corn, wheat, fish and cotton, the export of which are controlled by their respective boards.

There is nothing wrong with this strict control of foreign trade—most countries practise it today—but Portugal's object is not the economic development of the region but of Portugal herself. This is really the most blatant form of exploitation, for the poor colonies have to deprive themselves of imports, in order to enable Portugal to overcome her balance of payment difficulties. Neither the importer nor the consumer benefits by such a policy.

Government legislation also stands in the way of a proper development of the economy; more than anything else these laws show how brutally the Portuguese are exploiting the coloured people. Her policy is to levy a heavy tax on industry. The industrial tax is 10 per cent of the gross profit, and is levied not only on joint stock companies, but also on firms under individual owners. There is moreover a surtax of 70 per cent on the industrial tax. This looks impressive but the colonies have very few industries, and Portuguese policy has provided a loophole. Enterprises which develop natural resources (agriculture, forestry, cattle raising, fishing and mining), and most of the industries in the colonies which come under this category, are assessed on the basis of the exploitation tax. This is an extremely low tax and is merely 1 per cent of the first 20,000 escudos of income, 4 per cent on incomes between 20,000 and 100,000 escudos and 6 per cent on incomes over 100,000 escudos.

Most of the great industrial firms in Angola and Mozambique come under the category of enterprises

developing national resources. But, even more important is the power which the Government has of giving concessions. The Government of Angola has the power to give agricultural concessions of 5,000 hectares (one ha. = 2.471 acres), and can give three concessions of this size to a single individual or firm. The Minister for Colonies (now the Overseas Provinces) in Lisbon can give concessions up to 100,000 ha. The annual rent is only 0.8 escudos per ha. For the ranching industry the terms are even more generous. Concessions for this purpose are given for a period of 70 years. Of equal importance are the timber concessions—which are given for a period of 25 years, but 10-year extensions are generally given. The rent is at the rate of 0.15 escudos per ha. per year for the first ten years; it is increased by 25 per cent every tenth year up to the 60th year and a “just rate” for the last ten years is fixed by negotiation between the company and the Government.

Moreover, any project which would come into competition with an existing one, either in Portugal or in any of the other overseas provinces, has very little chance of success. In any case, 51 per cent of the invested capital in a company has to be Portuguese.

Apart from agriculture, mining is the most important form of developmental activity in the Portuguese colonies. Here too, as in the case of the other concessionaries, a big firm can open negotiations directly with the Ministry in Lisbon. The basic object of the government, it appears, is to share in the profits of the companies, and it, therefore, grants exclusive privileges and exemptions from taxes. The Diamond Company of Angola and the Petroleum Companies

have been granted exclusive rights. Ordinarily, a licence to prospect for minerals is issued by the Governor of a district, provided no exclusive rights have been granted in it. But, when a company wants to prospect an area larger than the district it applies to the Governor of the province.

Most of the important companies operating in the colonies have special agreements with the Government. The Benguela Railway concession of 1903, for example, was negotiated by Robert Williams with the Portuguese Government. The British Government pretended that it was completely in the dark, so that Germany could not protest that she had broken the provisions of the Windsor treaty. Portugal was most anxious that the agreement should be signed in order to break the Anglo-German treaty to partition the Portuguese colonies.

The Windsor treaty haunts Portugal. She is afraid that if a single power acquires economic dominance over the territory, her days as a colonial power will be limited. She has, therefore, passed two laws by which she hopes to maintain her power. First the Decree law 21, 228 of 24 November 1937 lays down that at least one-half of the capital of a corporation is to be owned by the native-born Portuguese. Secondly, three-fourths of the senior officials of a firm have to be Portuguese citizens. In the agreements signed with the Gulf Oil Company, the Portuguese Government has been given a certain amount of stocks, of the subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. In the revised agreement with the Diamond Company of Angola, the Government's share in the Company's stock has been increased to 12 per cent of the total

capitalisation. The net profits of the Company, moreover, are to be shared equally between the Company's shareholders and the Government. The Company has, moreover, cancelled the debts of over 100,000 *contos*³ which the Government owed them. In the Petroleum refining company too, the same principle has been followed; half of the shares of the Company are to be subscribed by the Government and Portuguese investors.

Along with this, Portugal attempted to counter-balance the economic interests of the great powers. Britain was dominant till 1948, but since then American influence has been slowly increasing. In Angola and Mozambique, the Belgians play an important role particularly in the mining industry. This is partly due to the fact that Belgium was a neighbour in the Congo, and the great industrial corporations of the Congo found Angola to be a mere extension of their territory.

The object of Portuguese policy is, therefore, quite clear. It is to get the large firms which are able to influence governments in their countries, like the Tanganyika Concessions, the American Oil Companies (both the Standard Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Company have acquired interests in Angola and Mozambique recently) to invest heavily in Portuguese territories. Portugal would then not only derive the advantages of increased revenue by sharing in the profits of these enterprises, but can in the event of an uprising by the Africans count on these firms to mobilise public opinion on her behalf in their respective countries.

³ 10,000 escudos make one conto.

VI

Before we proceed any further it is necessary to analyse two basic concepts of Portuguese policy, i.e. her claims that in Portuguese colonies there is a fundamental equality of races and that her object has been to assimilate the different peoples of the various provinces which constitute Portugal. One of the Portuguese myths—which we saw has very little foundation in history—is that Portugal has been a colonial power for over four centuries. This preposterous claim has been accepted not only by her friends but also by her foes. It is true that Portugal has had settlements on the coasts of Africa and Asia for over four centuries, but the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, as we know them today, were carved out in the nineteenth century. When Livingstone travelled in the interior of Mozambique he did not find any Portuguese in occupation of the territory. Arab slave traders there were on the Nyanza, as also Portuguese half castes. The owners of the great Prados carried out a relentless struggle against African kingdoms, but they fought equally against the Portuguese Governor. Till the middle of the nineteenth century the Africans though constantly raided by slavers maintained their independence. Is a hundred years span sufficient to judge Portuguese colonial policies or must one wait till the judgement day for a verdict?

But, before we analyse Portuguese policy, let us see who is a “native” in Portuguese Africa. The Portuguese have divided the African into two categories: the assimilated and the native. The native is

"an individual of colour who does not speak Portuguese or one of its dialects or of 'some other civilised language'; who does not abandon native customs and habits, and adopt European customs and habits; and who does not carry on a profession, trade or industry and does not have any private means." The Native Statute of 1954 defines a Native as a person "of black race, of black descent, born in the province or habitually resident in it, who has not yet the knowledge and the individual and social habits which are considered prerequisite to the complete application of the public and private law by which Portuguese citizens are governed."

The *indigena* can become a Portuguese citizen if he proves to the administrator that he fulfils the following conditions: (a) is more than 18 years old, (b) speaks the Portuguese language correctly, (c) exercises a trade or profession or has a private income, (d) has a good record of behaviour, (e) has not been noted as an evader of military service.

Let us now consider the Portuguese claims. Is their claim, that they do not have a colour bar based on race but only on culture, valid? The answer would be an emphatic No. Portugal is as racially conscious as the South African Republic; the only difference between the Boer and the Lusitanian being that the Portuguese are diplomatic enough to hide their racist policy. The Romans believed that fundamentally there was no difference between human beings. A man, whatever the pigment of his skin, was capable of acquiring civilization and becoming a Roman citizen. But they recognised differences in culture. An alien culture like that of the Jews could

not be wholly assimilated; the Christians were persecuted for they challenged the values which Rome cherished. But to those who accepted their values, Rome extended the privileges of Latinium and finally by the edict of Caracella that of full-fledged Roman citizens.

In the modern world, Russia—both imperial and communist—and France have accepted the Roman ideal. They, like the Romans, accept the fundamental equality of human beings. A man is judged not by the colour of his skin, but by his acceptance of certain values. In Russia, of course, it was the orthodox church, and the acceptance of Russian values; in the Soviet Union, it is Marx and the Soviet way of life; in France it is the French civilization. Every individual or group could aspire to become citizens of these empires, for their ideal was universal. Opposed to this concept is the Anglo Saxon idea of race. The Englishman, unconsciously believes that the human race reached its most perfect form on those islands; below them there are inferior breeds distinguished by a gradation of colour. For them there is no universal citizenship, the nations whom they conquer whether it is the Irish or the Welsh maintain their separate characteristics and remain unabsorbed.

Does Portugal live up to the ideal of equal rights for civilized men irrespective of their colour? Does she accept the people who have adopted Portuguese culture, and the Catholic religion on terms of equality with the citizens of the metropolis? Does she practice what she preaches? Or, are moral principles, like the brotherhood of man, far removed from practical

life? What does the history of Portuguese colonialism show us?

There is a basic contradiction in the Portuguese attitude. She is anxious above all to be recognised as a white power. This can perhaps be best seen in her boast that while the African considers the other Europeans by their nationality he considers the Portuguese primarily as the white man. This emphasis on colour—of the Portuguese being the white man—is also to be found in the USA and the Union of South Africa. It really underlines the Portuguese position. They are obsessed by colour; the struggle is seen in apocalyptic terms as one between blacks and whites, with the ever present danger that the black will emerge triumphant. The emphasis laid on Portugal's role as the defender of white civilization, the evacuation of white women and children from Angola, the arming of white civilians and the formation of vigilantes who indiscriminately slaughtered all blacks, clearly show that her object has never been to assimilate the African but to keep him as a helot, to be exterminated if he rose in revolt. It is true that Portugal refused to disband her native army in Mozambique when the South Africans asked her to do so, but this cannot be interpreted as a purely racial issue. South Africa has over 2½ million whites, it is able to raise an army entirely composed of white troops. Mozambique has only 70,000 Europeans, and very few of them are of the "poor white" type who provide South Africa with most of her troops. Without her native troops Portugal would have to withdraw her entire army from Europe in order to defend her empire.

Nor can one say that there is no colour bar in the Portuguese colonies. Portugal, it is true, does not practice "apartheid" in its most blatant form, but it is hardly necessary. Portuguese discrimination is worse than that in the Union of South Africa. It is no wonder that the African of Mozambique escapes to the Union, for South Africa, though it does not recognise him as a free man, at least recognises him as a worker. Though brutalised, and given the worst jobs, it at least allows him to earn his living. That there is a clandestine migration from the Portuguese colonies to the Union, speaks for itself about the condition in the colonies.

What is this freedom which the Portuguese African possesses? No "native" can under Portuguese law acquire property. By the Decree Law No. 3983 of 16 March 1918, all land not belonging to individuals or corporate bodies became the property of the State. Since the African system of landholding is communal, it effectively dispossessed him. He can travel in a train, but the fare he has to pay is at least a fourth of his daily earning. He can, it is true, if he has the money—which very few of the indigenous population have—enter a hotel or a restaurant, but the "rights of admission reserved" notices gives the authorities the power to exclude the African. His children can, of course, sit side by side with the children of white settlers and administrators in the schools, but in the only Liceu at Mozambique there are less than 10 black students among 800. According to most observers an educated African comes into contact with Europeans even less in the Portuguese colonies than in Southern Rhodesia. It is true that

the black and the white work side by side, but for doing the same work the white man is paid a higher wage. It is true that the prices for agricultural produce is fixed both for the white farmer and the black, but the blackman's produce is bought at a much lower price. It is true that the black man can marry a white girl as a white man can marry a black girl, but the three or four marriages of white girls with natives created a great scandal in Mozambique. It is true that the black man can visit the white man's cinema, but the correspondent of *The Times* had during eight or nine visits to the picture houses in Luanda not seen more than a dozen black faces. Of course, he can become a Portuguese citizen, if he fulfils certain stringent conditions. The recent tendency, however, has been to discourage the growth of the assimilado class. For example, while formerly only a knowledge of Portuguese was sufficient, now a sufficient knowledge including literacy in Portuguese is required before the African can acquire the status of an assimilado. It is well to remember that the illiteracy rate in Portugal is 23 per cent, and if Salazar's laws are applied to Portugal almost a fourth of the population would come under the status of the indigent.

Who is an assimilado? An assimilado is a person who has given up his traditional customs, adopted the Portuguese habits, speaks Portuguese and is a Portuguese in everything except his colour. His colour he cannot change. But this still does not explain his position. If he has been assimilated, he should normally become a Portuguese citizen on an equality with the white, brown or yellow people who

have the same rights. Why should there be a distinction between a citizen and an assimilado, which is extended even to the children of the assimilado ?

In law, of course, the assimilado does not exist. There are only citizens and natives. It is only race and colour consciousness that have created the assimilado, for it is a way of distinguishing between citizens by their colour. In fact, the assimilado, whatever may be his status in theory, does not differ in practice from the freedman of ancient times. The assimilados are never allowed to forget that they are different. The settlers and officials treat them with scorn. They become men of two worlds, not belonging to the society they have abandoned and not being accepted by the Portuguese. Considerable numbers of them have given up the status of the assimilado and reverted back to the status of "natives." But even the granting of citizenship is not absolute. Article 64 of the Statute of 1954 makes it clear that it can be revoked. The article says, "The citizenship conceded or recognized . . . can be revoked by decision of the judge of the respective circuit on the basis of evidence of competent administrative authority." This certainly does not apply to the white citizens of Portugal; even Dr Salazar has not thought of it.

The vision of a Pan Lusitanian Community has inspired Portugal. Luso-Africans and Luso-Asians along with the Portuguese are joined together by special bonds; the loyalty born of miscegenation, it is claimed, is able to override all others. As one Portuguese writer puts it, "One State, One Race, One Faith and One Civilization", these are the bonds that unite the Empire. Of course, the resemblance to

Hitler's ideology needs no comment. In the words of Salazar, "Like the Minho or Beira, Angola, Moçambique or India, is under the single authority of the State. We are a juridical and political unity; and we desire to go along the road to economic unity." This idea is based on her belief that Brazil is a monument to the success of the policy of assimilation. She takes Brazil, as the example *par excellence* of Portugal's success in the colonial field. She argues that the object of Portuguese policy is to create a society in Africa and Asia, which would be Luso-African, or Luso-Asian, like the mixed society that she has created in Brazil. As an American commentator⁴ points out, while one need not doubt the virility of the Portuguese male, it is doubtful whether this idea could really be put into practice. Moreover, today the settlers in Angola are arriving with their wives, or they marry girls from the settler villages, and hence miscegenation when it takes place, is casual, and the fathers generally abandon their offsprings who grow up in the villages. They are thus no better than the offsprings of the Boers who also cohabit with the African women. It is true that they were not willing, unlike the Portuguese to flaunt their black mistresses, but one must not forget that Lusus was a companion of Bacchus, and the Portuguese seem to have taken after the companion of their mythical progenitor. Nor must one forget that the so-called freedom in sexual matters is really a freedom for the Portuguese male to have Negro concubines. The Portuguese

⁴ Edwin S. Munger, "Mozambique; Uneasy Today, Uncertain Tomorrow" in American Universities Field Staff, *Report Service*, April 1961.

were and are anxious that no white girl should ever marry a Negro and live in their colonies. In fact, the number of Africans married to European girls would be even less than in some other parts of Africa. Thus the freedom which the Portuguese boast of is really one of the worst form of primitive imperialism: the exploitation of native women by the conquerors. It is in this light that one should analyse Portugal's most celebrated boast: God created the white man, and God created the black man, but it is the Portuguese who created the mulatto. To this the Africans rightly reply: God created the white man, and God created the black man but the devil created the Portuguese.

Since Portugal has based her claims as a successful colonial power on the Brazilian experiment, it would be worthwhile to examine the claim seriously. Gilberto Freyre in his *Masters and Slaves* has given a brilliant analysis of the process of integration. Freyre is naturally sympathetic to Portugal; he contrasts her policies with that of the Anglo-Saxons, but fails to show how the Portuguese are superior. In one way integration in Brazil was easier; the Portuguese were few in number, they, like the Negroes, were uprooted from their country and had a lower level of civilization than that of the Negroes. The mulatto became dominant in Brazil, replacing the Portuguese, but colour consciousness is not entirely lacking. Even today very few people of pure Negro descent are prominent in Brazil; colour continues to be an important factor in deciding the social status of a man.

Brazil, moreover, is an unfortunate choice from the Portuguese point of view. After three hundred

years of Portuguese rule, it finally decided to become an independent State. Thus, though the melting pot of Brazil turned out a more racially mixed product than the United States yet, integration in the sense that Portugal has been attempting—creating a Lusitanian Republic extending over the whole world—did not succeed. Brazil, therefore, should be a warning; a sign that the settlers in the colonies will not accept for ever the rule of Lisbon.

VIII

The most important aspect of Portuguese policy in the African colonies is that of forced labour. Every African male over 18 is forced by law to work for six months a year. In practice the African is tied down by contract for a period up to 18 months. The basic philosophy behind this law is simple. The African, it is argued, is a child. He has no sense of responsibility and it is for the Portuguese who have been divinely ordained to teach them to make him work. It is their duty, therefore, to convert the African; they have the responsibility to see that the African rises to the level of the Portuguese. It is, therefore, necessary for his good that the African should work.

This idea has been expressed in many ways. The African, it is argued, has to be beaten to learn how to use a plough, how to read and write and even how to pray. Both the administrator and the priest use the whip to teach their wards the dignity of labour.

From the beginning of the century, every visitor to Angola has written about the forced labour in the colonies. Cadbury and Nevinson had found that the

system did not differ materially from slavery. In one respect, it was very much worse. Under slavery, the slave owner acquires a piece of property; it is in his interest to see that this part of his capital is utilised in the best possible way. He, therefore, if interested in maintaining his capital sees that the value of the slave does not go down rapidly. Just as machinery requires maintenance and repair, a slave too requires medical attention and rest. Under the system which the Portuguese introduced, this aspect of slavery, that is, the personal ownership of the slave by a master does not exist. Indeed they were merely labour on contract. Formerly, the contract labour was sent mostly to the cocoa farms on San Thomé which attracted British interest, because they were the main purchasers of the cocoa grown by the settlers.

Contract labour by its very nature leads to abuse. The employer has no interest in maintaining it because he has merely to pay a wage. On the contrary he stands to gain by extracting as much work from his labourer as possible; to exploit him fully in the time he has at his disposal and then to get a fresh supply. As Captain Galvao remarks in his famous suppressed report, "In some respects the situation is more grave than that created by pure slavery. Under slavery the bought man, acquired as a head of cattle, was regarded as an asset by his master. He was interested in keeping him healthy and strong and agile in the same way as he would look after his horse or his bull." But when the worker is indentured the employer has no interest in his physical health; the result is that at least 40 per cent of the workers either die or are incapacitated. But this does not stop the

State from recruiting more workers for the same employers. They have merely to send in a signed requisition, and the administration supplies the required number. This is simple because, though the worker is forced by law to labour, he has no right to choose his own master but has to work where he is required. The labour on contract is sent to far distant countries: from Mozambique they were sent to Goa and Macau to meet labour shortages.

Though the condition under private employers is bad enough their condition under the government is even worse. The State insists that the private employer should pay a wage; in many cases it does not pay a wage, it does not even provide food. Nor does it employ the adult male, but the women, the children and the incapacitated. These are, of course, the residue of the labour supply; the adult male had been siphoned to the employment of private owners. But, it is these women and children with the help of the infirm and the incapacitated who have to do all the hard work—they are used on road construction.

The three Articles which deal with native labour in the Native Statute of 1954 are a masterpiece, and should be studied by everyone interested in hypocrisy. The State, it states, has a duty to make the indigena recognise that "work is indispensable to progress" but should impose it only in cases where the law specifically provides for it. Secondly, the indigena has a right to choose his work. Thirdly, if the indigena chooses to work for a non-indigena, it will be on the basis of a contract freely arrived at, and the State will have the right to supervise the labour. Even more interesting is Chapter LXXXCVI of the Organic Law which

prohibits any system by which the State undertakes to provide labour for private enterprises or by which natives of a particular district could be forced to work for any employer. The State should utilise native labour only for "public works of general interest to the community" (for example, roads) or to those where the benefit would accrue to them. Forced labour should only be confined to: (a) penalties imposed by a judicial sentence, and (b) work imposed in cases of non-fulfilment of fiscal obligation.

No wonder Galvao, then a high official of Portugal, was forced to admit that the people of Angola and Mozambique were showing their active disapproval of the Portuguese policy by emigrating to the neighbouring territories. The clandestine emigration was partly responsible, according to him, for the very grave "demographic aenemia." Galvao estimated that between 1938 and 1948 over a million people left the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, the annual rate being something over 100,000 persons per year. Not only this, the returned emigrant becomes an active propagandist, he paints a picture of freedom of labour, of high wages, and good living, and this encourages migration.

The result has been that vast areas of Angola and Mozambique appear completely deserted. The fear that they will be sent to San Thomé and since only the dead are really exempt from compulsory labour the great proportion of the population flees abroad, and the rest moves towards physical ruin.

Belo de Almeida, a Portuguese soldier in Angola, describes how the labourer was treated in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Since the system has

not altered in the least detail, it would therefore be worthwhile to quote him: "For the slightest fault they were often cruelly punished by being beaten with the hippopotamus hide whips which cut their skins horribly. Very frequently are heard in the warm mysterious African night piercing shrieks of pain from the poor wretches who were being beaten by the Company officers or head men, generally hard headed mulattoes."¹

Apart from this, Galvao points out that the birth rate has sharply declined. Infantile mortality is simply dreadful, it is as high as 60 per cent; prenatal and postnatal care as well as health services among Africans hardly exist and mortality rate among the workers is 40 per cent. This allows us to have some idea of the brutal régime Portugal had imposed on the African colonies.

They were not unaware of the evils of the system. Galvao was not the first one to point out to them. A long series of administrators had made it clear that if Portugal utilised the manpower in her colonies, instead of driving it away, the colonies could be more prosperous. For this they suggested, that instead of freed labour, economic incentives should be used. But the Portuguese, from the time they came into contact with the Congo basin, have preferred to utilise the elephant hide whip—according to their way of thinking the most effective way of persuading the African—rather than reason.

This is mainly because Salazar considers it as the proper function of the State to provide labour for the plantations and the mines. In other countries too

¹ Quoted in Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 154.

the system of forcing labour to work has been tried. The precept and example school in Kenya and Uganda for example wanted the Provincial Commissioners to provide labour. But by the twenties this school of thought had ceased to influence policy. In the Portuguese colonies, the Police still beat up unsatisfactory labour at the request of employers; African workman, according to the correspondent of *The Times*, were "kicked and cuffed" by Portuguese foreman, while the Police looked on.

Portugal is a corporate State; it is the State rather than the worker who has organised the trade union. There are three labour organizations which are horizontal rather than vertical. The membership embraces most of the European workers in the colony. In Angola there is collective bargaining only in the fishing industry—strikes are in any case illegal. The three syndicates are (1) The National Syndicate for the Employees of Commerce and Industry, (2) The National Syndicate for Chauffeurs, Drivers and Metallurgical workers, and (3) the National Syndicate of Civil Construction and Contractors. The *Portaria* 10,836 of July 29, 1959 has introduced a minimum wage legislation. But since there is no possibility of negotiation the minimum wage is also the maximum. The labour law of 1957 also fixed the work week of the employees—the hours during which they could be employed, and the maximum work which they had to do during a week. Thus in industry a 48-hour week was established and in office a 39-hour week.

Maximum age for employment has been reduced from 14 to 13 years, educational qualifications for children in employment have been raised while those

for adults reduced, apprenticeship regulations have been tightened so that adults cannot be trained as apprentices. The result of these measures would be to exclude the Africans from doing even semi-skilled work. Unless equal opportunities for education and training are provided for the Africans, measures like this would be discriminatory. These measures are, therefore, not liberal but oppressive. The labour laws, moreover, apply only to the citizens, i.e. the white citizens of Portugal. The lowest paid labour, the natives, who are in real need of protection were left at the tender mercies of the employers.

Recruiting in Angola and Mozambique is a profitable business. The system never reached the really frightening proportion of Leopold's Congo and there are no tell-tale fingers to tell this story. Salazar, however, has proved himself to be an apt disciple. He does not collect fingers, but the recruiters who send the natives of Angola and Mozambique into a modern slavery receive £5 per head. His method, therefore, has a certain refinement—headhunting is, of course, miles ahead of mere finger collecting. Salazar is 73, and cannot long postpone the day, when by the burning fires of hell, he can exchange stories of murdering Africans with that other distinguished master—Leopold.

Vachel Lindsay in his poem "The Congo," has expressed all the horrors which a sensitive soul felt when the full story of Leopold's Congo was revealed to the world.

Listen to the Yell of Leopold's ghost
Burning in hell for his hand maimed host

Hear how the demons chuckle and yell
cutting his hands off, down in Hell.

Would Salazar fare any better? The thousands of Africans he has murdered in cold blood, the hundreds of thousands of men, women and children, whom he and his agents have made homeless, would not their anguish torment him? And what of his allies, those merchants of death, who share with him the responsibility for these horrid murders? Even the devil might be afraid of Salazar as a neighbour.

ANGOLA

I

ANGOLA, the country which dramatically opened the eyes of the world to the brutalities of Portuguese colonialism, is one of the richest of African countries. Yet, its people are among the poorest. It has an area of 1246.700 sq. km. and is 14 times the size of Portugal. It includes the Cabinda enclave which is cut off from Angola by the Congo (Leo). It is surrounded on the north and north-east by Congo, on the east by Rhodesia, on the south by the Trust Territory of South-West Africa administered by the Union of South Africa, and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean.

Angola is, in a geographical sense, a transitional country. In the north are the equatorial forests and the marshes of the Congo with their luxuriant verdure and torpid heat; in the south the harsh desert of Moçamedes. At Luanda, the capital, the climate is tropical; at Moçamedes in the south it is Mediterranean. Moreover, the coastal area differs greatly from the interior. The coastal plains which have a length of 1,000 km. considering their location, are extremely pleasant; the Benguela current from the South Atlantic keeps the area cool. Though tropical, the Angolan coastal plains are not uncomfortable to

live in. The rainfall on the coast is between 25 and 40 cm, and occurs between February and April.

The coastal plains are cut off from the interior plateau by the Niompoka mountains. The mountain range which rises to considerable heights in certain places is the source of all the major rivers of the coast. Of these the Cuanza and the Cunena are the most important.

The plateau is economically the backbone of the country. Its average height is between 1,000 and 1,200 metres. It is an extremely fertile and healthy area, well irrigated with some good rivers—the Cuango, the Kasai and the Upper Zambesi being the most important. The rainfall on the plateau is between 1m and 1m 50 cm. The rainy season is from September to April but is divided into two unequal parts by a dry spell in January.

Though a large country, Angola is under-populated; the density of population is only 1.28 per sq. mile. Its 4.7 million inhabitants consist of many tribes, and speak a large number of languages. Of the 4.7 million, 200,000 are Europeans who have settled there recently. The major tribes, according to the census of 1950, are Oviumbindu, 1,443,742; Kimbundu 1,083,321; Kicongo 479,818; Lunda 357,696; Ngangela 328,277. These are the main groups; there are also many other tribes.

Angola has many large towns. The capital Luanda, is the largest, having a population of over 225,000 of which 35,000 are whites. Other important towns are Benguela, with a population of 19,000, Lobito, (32,000) and Sa da Bandeira. They have sizable white populations. Luanda, which has a tropical climate,

has been acclaimed as one of the most beautiful towns in Africa; it certainly is one that is expanding fast. The result has been that though many new buildings have come up in recent times there is an acute shortage of housing. According to an American source¹ the cost of living is high, one has to wait for months before getting a flat; with rents ranging between Rs. 600 and 1000 per month. Most of the food has to be imported; local meat according to this authority is not of good quality, so too locally cured ham.

It is true that Luanda is now enjoying a boom in the building trade. The government has invested large amounts of money, in bringing immigrants into Angola; but it has done very little to raise the standard of living of the people. Only 1 per cent of the indigenous population and 23 per cent of the 200,000 white settlers are literate. There is only one hospital bed for every 280,000 of the population. These hospitals—mostly ill-equipped—are in the coastal towns. In 1954 the number of students attending schools were merely 65,169 of which a majority (40,500) were in sub-primary schools where they were taught a little catechism and reading; 17,796 were in the primary schools; 4,200 in the secondary and technical schools and only 13 in high schools. Needless to say that these were whites.

As we saw, Angola was conquered between 1890 and 1910. It was only from 1913 that civil administration was introduced into the interior. The basis of the administration was racial—in areas with a white population the *Concelho* or the Council was the unit,

¹ "Living Conditions in Angola" in *World Trade Information Service*.

in the disturbed areas the *Capitanias-mores* was the unit; but these were to be turned into civil circumscriptions. The administrator of the civil circumscription was to be assisted by the *Chefe do Posto*. In 1914 the structure of administration was liberalised. Local autonomy, under the general supervision and broad economic control of Lisbon, was conferred on the colonies. In 1920, came the final measure of liberalism: "financial autonomy and decentralization compatible with the development of each" was conferred on Mozambique and Angola.

These early days, as far as the colonies are concerned, were good times. Portugal had a liberal régime and the colonies were not considered to be of great economic interest. But in 1926 a *coup d'état* brought Salazar into power. The effects were soon to be felt in the colonies. The dictatorship certainly did not believe in liberalism either at home or abroad. Armindo Monteiro, the Minister for Colonies, considered the liberal measures an abdication of power. For him and the dictatorship the African was born to be a slave.

But though liberalism was abolished, corruption which prevailed under the Republic was not. On the contrary, it increased. The colonial administrator was financially and morally corrupt. Africans were overcharged on the hut-tax; their pay in the Rand mines was taken by the administration; bribes were taken for supplying labour; and in Mozambique they even used the African school girls in the areas to provide concubines for the white population, including the administrators. Perhaps this was part of the official policy of creating Luso-Africans!

The colony of Angola, which became an overseas province of Portugal in 1951, has a Governor General, and governors for the various provinces. It is divided into 13 provinces which are again subdivided into *Concelho*, and *circumsesçao*; at the lowest level is an administrative post under a *Chefe do Posto*. In some zones, administration is really intensive, there being a post for almost every 4,000 inhabitants. But this is not all: in almost every village there is a Portuguese shopkeeper who acts as the eyes and the ears of the government, and reports to the administrative officer all that happens in the village.

The change in status really did not affect the administration. The colony became a province; the administration continued. The officials perhaps changed their designations without changing their functions. For all purposes it was a change of nomenclature; Portugal preferred to call her colonies overseas provinces. The provinces are Congo in the North, Lunda in the North-East, Luanza (on the coast, contains Luanda), Cuanza Norte (East of Luanda), Cuanza Sul (South of Luanza and Cuanza Norte), Malange (South of Congo between the two Cuanzas and Lunda), Benguela (coastal, South of Luanza and Cuanza Sul), Huambo (between Benguela and Moxico), Moçamedes (on the extreme South coast), Huila (to the east of Moçamedes), Bie (east of Huila), Cuando (east of Bie), and Moxico (to the north east of Cuando).

The Governor General is not an independent entity; he does not even control the Commander-in-Chief or the Director of Police. They like him take their orders directly from their respective ministries

in Portugal, but the Governor General has the right of precedence. He is helped by a Legislative Council which has advisory functions. This body, which has no power serves to voice local grievances, if anybody is bold enough to speak out in a dictatorship. Half the membership of the Council is, in any case, nominated by the Governor General; the other half is elected by a body of electors. Angola, moreover, has a right to send two deputies to the Parliament in Lisbon. She has her own budget, treasury and money, but they are all supervised by Lisbon. The *angolar* is equal in value to the escudo.

Power is thus concentrated in Lisbon. The foreign exchange reserves, the planning of economic development, and every other measure has not only to be referred to Lisbon, but decisions even on minor matters are taken in Lisbon. Luanda is merely a rubber stamp; it agrees to whatever is ordered from Lisbon and executes it as best it can. Thus as it does not even have the authority of a local government: plans are drawn in Lisbon, the money is made available, and the vast army of top ranking civilian officers merely carry out the orders.

The result of this concentration of power in Lisbon is well known. The Portuguese colonies are among the most backward in Africa. This is not due to the poverty of the soil. Indeed the Belgians, who are quite familiar with the territory, claim that Angola is even richer than Katanga. According to them, gold, copper, diamonds and other minerals are found in this area. This, of course, can only be confirmed after proper surveys are carried out. The occurrence of iron ore, manganese, tungsten, vanadium, copper, tin, zinc,

lead, beryl and other minerals, as well as petroleum suggest that a proper survey will pay a rich dividend. The Americans have not been slow to realise the importance of Angola and Mozambique as one of the greatest potential reservoirs of minerals.

United States' interest in Portuguese colonies had some repercussions. For example, in 1948 Portugal passed a law abrogating the concessions, which were mainly British. The pretext for this measure was the "expansion of national control over the economic activities in Africa." This, however, did not affect the great corporations like the Benguela Railway or even the plantations. Nor was national control exercised under this law except in the case of the Beira port, and the Beira railway. But the result has been a growth in the number of firms of American origin, or subsidiaries of the great American companies. According to one source, the Cumbustivos de Lobitu and Petroléos de Angola are closely allied with the Chase National Bank, and the National City Bank as well as the Standard Oil Company. Besides, United States' capital came in through organisations like the Mutual Aid Agency, the Marshall Aid, and the International Cooperative Administration. A geological survey was carried out by E. J. Longyear Company of Minneapolis, under the aegis of the International Cooperative Administration.

II

The most important product of Angola is coffee. Coffee is grown in the north, mainly on plantations owned by companies or by European farmers. It

accounts for about 45 per cent of Angola's exports. The volume of exports has also been large—fluctuating between 70,000 and 80,000 tons a year. The coffee is exported to the United States and Europe, and is Portugal's most valuable dollar earner. Next in importance to coffee is the diamond industry, which is entirely in the hands of the Companhia Diamante da Angola, commonly known as Diamang. It is essentially a monopoly, and is controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation de Beers and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

The Diamond Company, formed in 1921, was given an exclusive right to prospect in an area of over a million sq. kilometers. In the twenties and thirties the Diamond Company dominated the economy of the country. In 1923, its share of exports was 36 per cent and by 1935 the proportion had risen to 45 per cent. Its monopoly is complete; it dominates the economy of Lunda, where it is the only industrial enterprise in operation. A law, which allows only industrial concerns operating in Lunda to recruit labour there, has effectively secured for it the monopoly of labour. The government gives the Company a large number of concessions. For example, the Company is exempted from paying taxes on its imports of machinery and materials. On the other hand, the Company does give the government loans which it does not hope to recover. Thus by the 1955 Agreement, a debt of 108,000 *contos* was cancelled and the government share in the capital of the Company increased from 6 to 12 per cent.

The Company exported in the period January-May 1961 diamonds worth 3.49 million escudos.

The value of diamonds exported in the same period in 1960 was only 235 million escudos. Obviously, the increase in exports was an attempt to earn as much foreign exchange as possible in a short period, in order to acquire the guns and naplam bombs to destroy the Africans. The Diamang is fortunate in that it is situated far from the troubled areas. The Company has been paying a dividend of 27 per cent for the last few years, though its average has been a mere 20 per cent.

The Diamang is the most important monopolist in Angola. It has been rightly called "Portugal's most notable private enterprise." It, today, accounts for 12 per cent of all exports. The State, therefore, is extremely lenient towards it. It has the sole right to mine diamonds in Angola; it has a private garrison which has been substantially increased this year. It has also the lowest paid mine-workers anywhere in Africa.

The third major export of Angola is fish. The cold Benguela current has made the sea near southern Angola one of the richest fishing centres in the world. The fishing industry is concentrated in the south. Indeed, Moçamedes lives on its fishing industry. The importance of the fishing industry to the south can be seen by the fact that almost the entire population of the Concelho of Moçamedes is concentrated in the town. It is a European industry and is carried on by small firms—mainly as family businesses. The State actively encourages the industry, not only because it accounts for 12 per cent of the exports but because it brings in a hardy seafaring people of Portuguese stock to settle in the area.

Angola's other exports are of lesser importance. Between the aforementioned three they account for 67 per cent of the total exports. Of the other exports, sisal, which is grown by European farmers is the second largest agricultural export. Sisal became an important crop only after the war. In 1941 only 3,137 tons of sisal was produced and sold for 8,274 *contos*. But with the boom in tropical products the price of sisal shot up and production naturally increased. 23,197 tons of the value of 328,799 *contos* were exported in 1951. But this was the last prosperous year; prices fell, but as the plantings matured, production and exports rose without bringing in additional revenue. Corn is another major crop, and is exported to neighbouring territories. Manganese and copper are mined, but they do not form a large percentage of the exports.

Other extractive industries are mining of manganese and iron ore. Iron is found at Saia, though mining has not yet started. Krupps of Germany is vitally interested in exploiting Angolan iron ores. Their technicians are already there and they propose to invest 1,300 million escudos to be amortised in seven years.

90,000 tons of cement are manufactured at Lobito and 200,000 at Luanda. A new company—the Mabor de Angola—an offshoot of General Tyres of America has been started with an initial capital of 1.75 million dollars. It is proposed to raise this to 5.3 million.

The sugar industry is of major importance in the economy of Angola and Portugal. Sugar cane is cultivated by two large foreign-dominated plantation companies, the Companhia de Açúcar and the Sociedade de Cassequel. Both have very large areas under

cane, and have capacity to increase the acreage as well as the refining capacity if there is any incentive to do so. The Portuguese policy, however, is to buy the sugar at prices very much below what prevails in the open market with the result that there has been a continuous decline in the acreage under cane as well as in the quantity exported. There are possibilities of increasing sugar production enormously, but because of Portuguese policy sugar has ceased to be a major export.

The economic dominance of the large plantations in agriculture can be seen by the fact that Companhia Angola de Agricultura, a British controlled firm—which was taken over by the Portuguese under the nationalisation law of 1948—occupied 17,000 sq. km. Today the most important single agricultural enterprise in Angola is the Companhia Geral de Algodao de Angola (Cotonang) a subsidiary of the Fomento Geral de Angola. It was formed in 1926 with the object of cultivating and exporting cotton. Its headquarters is at Lisbon. At Sunguize, it has an experimental station with 5 zones and 20 sectors with Europeans as sector heads. Experiments on cotton cultivation are carried on by the Company.

The actual cultivation of cotton is, however, done by the Africans on their farms. Cotonang merely purchases the cotton. This it does, at dates and places fixed by itself, at a price fixed by the government. The African has no voice in running the industry except to cultivate the cotton; the price which is paid to the peasant is extremely low.

Among the crops grown by the Africans are manioc and corn which is used for local consumption. Indeed



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in Angola and Mozambique what surprises one is the complete lack of a policy for native agriculture. In the Belgian territories and the French, the African peasant was forced to grow certain crops. Governor Anglouvant for example forced the peasants of the Ivory Coast to grow cocoa. But the cocoa was grown by peasants and they were paid a fair price for it; they therefore had an incentive to take up the cultivation of commercial crops. The administration in these territories realised that the true coloniser is the State, and the only colon the African peasant. In Angola Portugal follows a different policy. They insist that the only way to make Angola safe is to colonise it. Implicit in this policy is the denial that the Africans can be assimilated, and can become loyal citizens of Portugal.

III

Underlying the Portuguese policy of colonisation there have been two basic ideas. Till 1920 the Portuguese colonies did not attract colonists from Portugal. The people who wanted to emigrate were keen to escape from Portugal's rule. They, therefore, preferred to go to Brazil where the opportunities for achieving a higher standard of living were very much greater. Angola, with its low density of population, its healthy and salubrious climate is certainly suitable for settlement, but the main problem is one of capital. Salazar's object is not to develop the economy of the area through large plantations, but to reduce the pressure of population in Portugal; and by sending a large number of illiterate Portuguese peasants to

Angola and Mozambique to make these countries one of white settlement. The poor peasants, it is believed, make excellent settlers for they bring large tracts of land in the temperate zone under cultivation. It is proposed to have a white population in Angola of 500,000 by 1970, which would form the nucleus of an African Brazil.

The scheme though thought out in the twenties could not be implemented. Even though Salazar's policy is that the settlers should be small farmers who cultivate their own land until the end of the war the scheme could not be implemented because of the heavy cost. Then American money started flowing in through various channels.

The Hydro-Technic Corporation of New York conducted a survey in Angola under the auspices of the International Cooperative Administration. It recommended the establishment of a pilot farm for irrigated and dry farming in the Bengo river basin. It also suggested that it would be possible to have a 2 million head cattle industry if ranching is properly developed. In that case ranching will become a major industry. Under American auspices a large slaughterhouse and refrigeration plant has been set up in the Cela colony. This had been done with a Marshall Plan credit of 663,000 dollars. In any case the lack of cattle has meant that mixed farming by peasants, whether European or African, is not practised in Angola. Only large companies engage in mixed farming; this is easy for them for they maintain large heads of cattle to produce meat for their workers.

In 1950 the Agriculture Department engaged a group to study the possibilities of white settlement

on the plateau of Ambiom. The group recommended the Cela area, which is a plateau 4,000 ft. above sea level, as suitable for settlement. There, an area of over $1\frac{1}{4}$ million acres was set aside for white settlement. The mountains are rich in timber, and it is extremely well watered. There are several streams and irrigation by channel is extremely easy. With irrigation two crops can be grown a year. The principal crops include rice, soyabeans, maize and vegetables. The idea has been to settle families on their own farms. They have to work with their own hands, and are not allowed to utilise native labour. Dr Salazar's idea of colonisation can be seen in the slogan: "For each hand a hoe. For each family a home. For each mouth bread."

The settler, however, is treated extremely well. He is provided with a three-room house. The farm consists of 15 acres of irrigated land, 30 acres of non-irrigated land and 100 acres of pasture. This does not include the garden and orchard which surround the house. Besides this, they are provided with five acres of land suitable for coffee cultivation. The land is prepared for cultivation before the settler arrives, and he is also provided with bullocks, carts, milch cows, seeds, farming implements: in short, everything that a farmer requires. During the first year he can obtain everything on credit from the Central Canteen.

These are not gifts. The total cost per farm comes to 150 *contos* or about 12,000 pounds sterling. It has to be repaid within a period of 25 years. Repayment starts in the 4th year.

The plan is not to bring isolated settlers, for Salazar believes that if isolated settlers are brought they may

soon lose their conservatism. He therefore wants as many people from a single village as possible. These groups register with a board of settlement composed of officials from Angola, and when a sufficient number has been recruited they are brought to Angola and settled. By 1953, Salazar had succeeded in creating 20 villages with 400 families.

The transport system of Angola is slightly better than that of Mozambique. It has 35,489 km of roads, of which 8,850 are classified as first class, i.e. all weather roads. There are only 250 km of paved road. The railway system is 2,679 km long; there are four major lines: (i) The Luanda Malange (426 km) which extends from Luanda to Malange in the north is important for the export of coffee. It is proposed to extend this railway to the frontiers of Congo. It has been extended up to Lui. (ii) The Lobito-Taxiera de Souza—the Angolan section of the Benguela Railway—is 1,498 km. (iii) The MoCamedes-Sa da Bandeira (248 km) is important, because it serves the south; it is being extended to Matala. "This extension is part of a major project to extend the line to the North Rhodesian frontier." (iv) The fourth railway line is the Amhiom railway, which is State owned. Thus of the four, two are State owned and two privately owned. Recently, the Benguela Railway entered into an agreement with the Companhia Mineira de Lobito to construct a branch line connecting Cuime with Vila Robert William in order to transport iron ore to Lobito. The Benguela Railway dominates the transport system. In 1955 out of 1,167,324—the total passengers arrived by all railways—it carried 809,900; out

of a total freight of 2,595,498 tons, it carried 2,266,047 tons.

Equally important are the hydro-electric projects which have been undertaken recently. The most important existing project is the Mabutas which produces 57 million kwh. Of the other projects, the Biopo dam produces 38 million kwh and serves the Lobito-Benguela area. The Matala project on the Cuenne east of Sa da Bandeira is designed to produce 69 million kwh and the most important of all, the Cuanza Valley project at Combambe, to produce 4 billion kwh. The I.C.A. in conjunction with the Portuguese Government carried out a survey conducted by the Hydro-Technic Corporation of New York in the Cuanza and Bengo river basins. These two, according to them, offer vast potentialities for agricultural and industrial development. A sixty-mile stretch of Cuanza is capable of producing 1 billion kwh. It is expected that the first phase of this scheme producing 700 million kwh would be completed by 1962. Both the Benguela Railway and the Diamond Company have their own plants for producing electricity, and they supply the towns of Nova Lisboa and Dondo respectively.

The driving force behind the Cuanza project is the great French aluminium firm of Pechiney. Pechiney has been in the African field for some time; they are behind the Edea in the Cameroons, the bauxite projects in Guinea and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Now they appear to be willing to invest large sums in starting an aluminium industry in Angola.

Angola should serve as an example to the orthodox economists. Since 1933 it has been having a favour-

able balance of trade and a budget surplus; development however was slow. It was the post-war boom in the demand for raw materials, caused by American stockpiling and the willingness to invest in under-developed countries, that led to the growth of the Angolan economy. Yet, even in 1951, the head of the Finance Department in his observations on the Public Accounts warned that the financial situation "was the product of a favourable emergency which might end from one moment to another."

Her economic boom has been noted by many. A British official publication, for example, wrote in 1958, "In Angola new buildings, expanding communication, the founding of new and the mechanization of old industries, the production of ever more hydro-electric power and the increasing exploitation of the wealth of the land determine the form of the market."² While this is true, the prosperity was not only new but short-lived. Moreover, it was confined to the settlers; the African was hardly affected by it, he still continues to be a badly paid wage earner. But between 1951 and 1957 Angola had a period of unprecedented prosperity; the number of industrial concerns operating in Angola increased from 1,000 to 2,250. She was not only Portugal's best customer, but also her best dollar earner. This was the result of increased exports of coffee, diamonds and fish.

New industries had also come up. The increase in hydro-electric power was the basis of industrialisation. In 1955 Petrol was discovered near Luanda, and the American Oil Company which was carrying out the exploration also decided to set up a refinery

²*Board of Trade Journal*, April 11, 1958.

capable of handling 100,000 tons. A small textile mill with 10,000 spindles was started in Luanda in 1946; its production then was 140,000 metres but by the late fifties it had increased to 2 million metres. Angola like Mozambique has also started turning its sisal into rope.

Angola, though prosperous, continued to be dominated by the great concessionaires; the Companhia de Diamantes, Companhia de Bituminosis, Empresa de Cobre de Angola, Companhia Mineira de Lobito, Sociedade Mineira do Lombage, Sociedade Boliden de Moçambique Limitada (a Swedish firm) and the Companhia do Maganés. These along with the agricultural concessions dominate the entire economy. Each exercises a virtual monopoly in its own field: Empresa is the only one which has the right to produce copper, Maganes has a monopoly of manganese. As a result, they have been unwilling to exploit the resources fully. Empresa, for example, is not interested in ores in which the copper content is less than 11 per cent.

By 1959 Angolan prosperity came to an end. There was a slump in the Coffee market. Only Sisal prices continued to show a favourable trend. There was depression even in the fishing industry. A special fund was created to assist the industry, and the government even waived the tax on it.

Angola, in 1960, had an unfavourable balance of trade for the fourth year in succession; the fall in coffee prices continued; imports, however, rose again because of the needs of the ten year plan. The Government imposed credit restrictions which were again tightened in the second half of 1960. The Board of Foreign

Trade refused to grant import licences except for the most essential items and importers were forbidden to send money to Portugal. Businessmen became increasingly critical of the restrictions. The public had less and less money and they were, therefore, unable to clear their stock. As an American official publication says "In short, business in Angola, cannot be presently described as anything but poor."²

This was not all. The unsteady nature of Angolan economy adversely affected her foreign reserves, which almost "reached the vanishing point." On 1 January 1961 her foreign exchange reserves were only 13,856,151 dollars, though by February it had risen to 16,885,193 dollars.

This is the background to the trouble in Angola. Settlers were discontented because of the economic troubles, which lowered their standard of living; the vague stirrings of the nationalist spirit was leading the Africans to unite.

Industrial Production—Major Commodities

Commodity	1949	1953	1954	1955
Sugar brown (tons)	26,844	27,094	25,082	23,580
White (tons)	15,707	17,654	12,082	13,479
Crystal (tons)	—	5,290	6,729	4,906
Alcohol (litre)	1,000,855	1,177,759	1,312,138	610,163
Beer (litre)	—	2,187,000	3,425,000	4,129,000
Cement (tons)	—	28,690	42,162	70,333
Cotton (metres)	769,145	2,308,473	2,073,799	2,500,194

Mineral Production in 1955

Diamonds (carats)	743,377	valued at	341.8 million escudos
Salt (tons)	57,848	"	19.9
Copper ore (tons)	8,136	"	8.9
Manganese (tons)	31,618	"	4.4
Mica	249	"	2.7
Asphalt	17,295	"	1.0

² *Foreign Commerce*, April 17, 1961.

IV

In Angola, a nationalist movement has been in existence for some time. In 1952 a religious movement with strong political undertones was suppressed. Thwaite in his book mentions that in the twenties there was a plot to kill all the whites in Luanda. This is, however, the first time that an *active nationalist* movement has come into being in Luanda. This does not mean that till now there has been no popular movement against Portuguese rule; on the contrary, Portuguese rule in the colonies has been a history of suppressions. Numerous rebellions have been brutally suppressed, but from 1954, when the Communist Party of Angola was formed, the clandestine movement has been properly organised and has grown enormously. The most notable event in this period of active preparation was the "trial of the fifty-seven" of 1959. The 57 persons were charged with "offences against the external security of the state and the unity of the Nation." The first trial was of 15 Angolan Africans, one Negro from the United States, and one Negro from Cuba. The second was of 32 Angolans, 7 Portuguese and one coloured seaman from the United States. All the non-Portuguese were absent.

Between March and August 1959 over 200 persons were arrested. In 1960 there came the trial of the fifty-two. The trial of the fifty-two made history. Among the arrested were Father Joachim de Andrade, and Neto, the famous Angolan poet. In a way this was the best publicity which the young nationalist movement could get. The people of his native district protested against the brutal treatment of Neto by the Portu-

guesse, but the PIDE just massacred the peaceful demonstrators.

This period of preparation is important. Two parties have emerged in Angola as national parties as a result of this. One is the Uniao das Populações de Angola: Union of the populations of Angola (UPA). This was originally a tribal union of the people of northern Angola, but has now become a national party. The Union in its manifesto "The Struggle for the Independence of Angola" made it clear that its objectives are: (i) to fight for the independence of Angola, (ii) to bring about an understanding within the Angolan population, (iii) to develop national and patriotic sentiments, and (iv) to fight for African unity. The Union naturally found the atmosphere of Leopoldville congenial, and it is to Leopoldville that they moved. They are associated with the party of Patrice Lumumba. The leader of the party is Roberto Holden Gilmore who has broadcast several times from Leopoldville. In September 1960 the Union started publishing a journal in Leopoldville—*The Voice of Angola*.

The close linking of the Union with Lumumba was not liked by the leaders of the Abako. They in turn sponsored a movement N'Gwizako which is the organ of the people of the province of Kongo. In October 1960 the N'Gwizako published in a Leopoldville journal a manifesto demanding that the Cabinda enclave should be detached from Angola, and should join the Congo in a federal union. A few days earlier a group known as the "Association of the People of the Enclave of Cabinda" had issued a manifesto accusing the Portuguese of having violated the treaty of 1885

by attaching Cabinda to Angola. They demanded that Cabinda should be detached from Angola and become independent.

The best organised party is, of course, The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola). According to the *New Times* the Communist Party of Angola, formed in 1954, merged with some other nationalist parties to form the Movement. Mario de Andrade makes it clear that the party is a socialist one; it was formed, according to him, by the leaders of the former group of Marxists and the party of the united struggle of the Africans of Angola. Andrade, its President, is a graduate of Sorbonne, and Neto one of its Vice-Presidents holds a doctorate from Lisbon and is the national poet of Angola. Andrade has his headquarters in Conakry, but some members of his committee are in Brazzaville.

A body which is closely associated with the Movement is the National Union of the Workers of Angola. Trade unionism is illegal in the colonies, and it is therefore difficult to say how much support the National Union has. But it has functioned as a clandestine body for some time, and therefore must be having considerable support among the workers.

Mario de Andrade made it clear at the Casablanca Conference that the struggle against imperialism in Angola can only be an armed one; political activity is only clandestine and there is no way of finding out the strength of the parties. He, therefore, suggests that all the nationalist parties should unite. De Andrade had prepared his ground carefully. He had formed a front of the left-wing parties—Frente Revolucionaria

para a Independencia Nacional das Colonias, better known by its initials the FRAIN. The Union, however, kept aloof from the Revolutionary Front. Thus the nationalist movement has already split into a revolutionary and a moderate wing. Yet, one must not forget that both are national parties supported by large numbers of people of all tribes.

The national character of the opposition to Portugal has to be kept in mind. This is the first time that a national movement has come into being in Angola; till now the resistance movements had been tribal. In a police State, which does not allow any form of corporate activity, it requires considerable abilities to organise the most backward classes into a national opposition. Portugal herself has no organised opposition to Salazar.

In more ways than one, the rising showed the weaknesses of Portuguese policy, i.e. her attempt to absorb the elite of the nation by giving them rights of citizenship. The opposition is led by the assimilado and the coloured or by persons who have, though possessing the necessary qualifications, refused to loose their identity with the common people.

V

In January 1961 the Portuguese found that the Angolans were plotting to overthrow the régime. On the 3rd and 4th of February a group of patriots armed with machine guns attacked the prisons in Luanda and liberated a large number of political prisoners. The Angolan war of liberation had started. Portugal was quick to realise the significance of events. On the

7th of February she despatched paratroops trained in jungle warfare. On the 9th the leaders of the opposition in Portugal visited the President and asked him to restore the fundamental liberties. By March the disturbances spread to the north where a massive rising of the Bacongo people took place.

The north Angolan rebellion started in a coffee plantation called Primavera near San Salvador. It spread to the whole of the Kongo province, and then to Malange and Luanda provinces and by the beginning of April had spread to Nova Lisboa and other towns of the Elizabethville-Benguela Railway. One does not have to seek the reasons for the pre-eminence of the north. The Bacongo people—heirs of the great empire of Kongo—had been divided among the rival imperialism of France, Belgium and Portugal. By 1957, France had decided on autonomy; in 1958 the Africans of the French empire were given the choice of freedom. In 1960 the Belgian Congo became independent. The Bacongo people thus saw their brothers enjoying the fruits of freedom; no international frontier could keep the Bacongo people of Angola from striving to achieve the same. Leopoldville and Brazzaville were sympathetic. Arms, it was thought, could be procured, and they, therefore, rose in revolt. The northern rising was naturally viewed sympathetically in Leopoldville.

The opposition in Portugal did nothing to hinder the government's measures. Governor General Torranes was quick to blame the African States and the Communist bloc. He declared that the movement was Communist inspired, and did not have support of the people. The Portuguese news agencies maintained

that the army of liberation came from Congo and were supplied with Czech arms. Throughout the year the Portuguese officials maintained that it was a Communist inspired move, and that Soviet trawlers and submarines were landing agents in Tigers Bay. But there was no evidence to support Soviet intervention.

By the end of March she could no longer pretend that the Angolans were not fighting. Three Companies of native soldiers rose in revolt, and joined the freedom fighters. The Portuguese were in a quandary; they could no longer trust their African auxiliaries and therefore had to rely on their air force. In brutal action, which shocked even her friends, Portugal used naplam bombs on women and children to soften the resistance, and then the army moved in literally to kill. By the end of March the number of Portuguese dead had risen to 460, while refugees in their thousands went to the Congo. General Beliza Ferraz who supervised the mass killing of Africans boasted that the situation was well under control. But the business interests were more sanguine. They realised that the revolt was nothing less than a struggle for liberation, and if it is to be quelled, then authority must be transferred to Luanda. Their demands were: (i) transfer of the overseas Ministry to Luanda, (ii) immediate declaration of a state of emergency and the granting of dictatorial powers to the Commander-in-Chief, (iii) creation of an administrative council composed of people with local knowledge, and (iv) economic assistance on a massive scale.

This was in effect a demand for settler rule and military dictatorship in Angola. But, this was not the

only crisis which Salazar had to face. In Lisbon a group of army officers led by the Defence Minister demanded that he should resign within 48 hours. The Defence Minister declared that the situation in Angola was extremely critical, and the army had been led into an intolerable position from which it could not retreat without loss of prestige. They therefore wanted a political solution. But Salazar had no difficulty in suppressing a revolt which did not come off. The only result was a reorganisation of the government. Professor Adriano Moreira became Minister for the Overseas Provinces, General Gomes de Arango became the Chief of the Staff and the dictator personally took over Defence.

With the crushing of the internal rebellion Salazar prepared in earnest for war. He withdrew the Portuguese division serving with the NATO and sent it to Angola. Three or four classes were mobilised for meeting the emergency. Meanwhile, Portugal started evacuating women and children from Angola. Salazar proposed to use the opportunity to suppress the African nationalist movement by exterminating every educated African. Without educated leaders, Salazar argues, the nationalist movement will not be able to maintain itself. The special correspondent of *Sunday Telegraph* wrote on 20 May, "People arrested include school teachers, 'assimilados' and almost every African who is literate. Possession of a grammar primer, a wireless set or even just a bicycle has been enough to lead to a man's disappearance. African priests have in many cases been inexplicably transferred to Portugal in an attempt to empty the country of every potential African leader."

The object of the campaign was simple. It was to free the coffee area from the rebels. Angola's coffee brings most of Portugal's foreign exchange, and if the rebels succeed in stopping the harvesting of the coffee crop, Portugal's economy would collapse. Angola, as *The Times* pointed out, is Salazar's Achilles' heel. He is therefore fighting for his political life. For the Portuguese the African is an animal, and a vicious one too; for when struck he could bite. Therefore, Salazar declared, these savage animals must be destroyed.

The army offensive, however, did not succeed in its objective; most of the coffee crop was destroyed, and even though labour was imported from the south, under army escort, the move was not successful. By the end of April, Portugal was facing a major racial war in northern Angola. The rebels, since their object was the destruction of colonialism and the overthrow of the régime concentrated on destroying the plantations, and killing off the isolated settlers. Portugal, on her side, decided to exterminate the entire population of northern Angola, while accusing the Angolans of organised genocide. The government decided to create without delay an airport near Luanda capable of handling jet planes as also to build runways capable of handling large planes near all the important towns. This is necessary if bombing is to be carried out efficiently.

But, neither napalm bombs nor strafing of innocent women and children had any effect on the war. By the beginning of June the Portuguese news agency was reporting increased rebel activity in northern Angola. The Salazar régime even encouraged the

settlers to arm themselves. These civilian vigilantes took the law into their own hands, and in Luanda and other towns started shooting the innocent Africans who were dragged out of their houses. *Time* magazine (19 May) describes the Portuguese brutality in some detail: of settlers who shot down Africans at random, and tore off one by one the limbs of human beings. The *Sunday Telegraph* of 20 May noted that "the terror and lynching of Africans has at last stopped." But this was not so. Portuguese troops numbering 8,000 were already active in northern Angola, along with 10,000 African auxiliaries from the south, and more troops estimated at 15,000 were being sent. The total strength of the Portuguese army is only 34,000 and there is no proper officer cadre. The war in Angola is something which may be beyond its strength.

The Portuguese were hoping that the south would remain unaffected. By June 1961 the liberation army was active in central Angola. By November 1961, Salazar had 50,000 troops in Angola. A rebel column attacked the small town of Ambriz only 87 miles away from Luanda. The rebels attacked the town for three days and though they failed to take it, the extreme weakness of the Portuguese military position was exposed. Nor was this all. Even in the Kimbundu area, the area where Portugal had to wage a war a few years ago, the liberation movement is active. As early as July 18th the correspondent of *The Times* reported that a column had left Luanda for this area. According to the *Guardian*, the dense forest areas of central Angola had become the centre of fierce fighting. Besides, the Police had discovered plots to

murder the whites not only in areas near Luanda, but also in the south.

Portuguese brutality—not only the PIDE but the entire army has been accused of it—was noted by all the foreigners who were in Angola. Most of these were foreign missionaries. A large proportion of them were arrested though later released. The Methodists have indicated that of the 165 African ministers and pastors in Angola, 17 have been killed and thirty are in prison. The authorities have completely disrupted the missions which have been forced to withdraw from Angola. In July the Ministry of the Interior issued a communiqué in which it accused certain clandestine organisations of helping the Africans to escape. On 19 July Dr. C. W. Scott was arrested. Nor was this confined to Protestant missions. Monsignor Manuel Mendes das Neves, Vicar-General of Angola, and four other priests were arrested for supporting the nationalist movement. Salazar suspected the whole Catholic hierarchy of Angola, for they in a pastoral letter had declared: "The church is entirely within the limits of its mission in advising citizens to unite among themselves for the moralization of laws and institutions and for the formation of a more perfect solution."

Yet Portugal knows that she has to make a big effort. The colons have to be looked after, and a full scale war has to be waged against the Angolans. Salazar is attempting to achieve both these objectives at the same time. If the colons withdraw in any number, Angola cannot be held; without suppressing the liberation movement, Angola cannot be made safe for the settlers.

In a way, the situation is reminiscent of Kenyatta's struggle for Kenya's independence. But in Kenya the war was, comparatively speaking, a mild affair. Britain was able to bring overwhelming force to coerce the African. The savagery of the war in Angola can be seen in the number of casualties. In Kenya the total number of Europeans who died because of the Mau Mau action is only about 20; in Angola they number is already over a thousand. No area of Kenya became depopulated. In Angola "the entire northern area . . . is deserted today. Every one has fled except the old and the infirm." The number of Africans, who vanished without trace, has been estimated as between 50,000 and 100,000, and even the Baptist Missionary Society estimated that by the end of June over 35,000 Africans had been massacred. *Time* (19 May, 1961) points out that 800 refugees a day have been entering the Congo; estimates vary, but conservatively 50,000 Angolan refugees are said to have reached the Congo by May 1961. Nor must it be forgotten that the total population of Angola is only 4.5 millions, and that the two northern provinces do not have a population of over a million. Thus between 1/6th and 1/3th of the entire population of the north of Angola have been either exterminated or driven away from their homes.

At the same time Portugal is hoping, indeed Salazar is luring his hired assassins, to settle in the land they have depopulated. After their mission is over they are to turn their swords into ploughshares. Thus the danger of another war can be met. At any attempt by the Angolans to liberate their mother country,

the soldier turned farmer will be ready to defend Portuguese civilization.

VI

The war in Angola made even the Portuguese realise that the Angola of Papa is gone for ever. Dr Salazar was forced to recognise that even ideologically armed Portugal, if it did not bow to the wind, would have to face the whirlwind. He, therefore, decided to initiate reforms. But these reforms should not deceive anybody, they are like the Portuguese constitution, excellent on paper, only the intention of those in power to work them is doubtful.

The new reforms legally abolished the status of the "natives," and established equality between the races. Portugal, therefore, recognised the people of the overseas provinces as a whole to be co-citizens of Portugal. It, moreover, for the first time allowed collective bargaining, collective wage agreements, etc. and removed the vexatious agricultural regulations. The new reforms also introduced a certain amount of local government, but the insistence on "literary qualification" made the reform meaningless in a country where 99 per cent of the population is illiterate.

The object, which Lisbon has in mind, is clear: the settler must at all costs be conciliated. Their complaints as we saw, concerned, mainly, difficulties of transferring money to Portugal, heavy taxation, and lack of freedom. The government proposed to win over the settlers by a bold policy of forming a Common Market. The customs barrier between the provinces, and between them and Portugal will be

progressively abolished. Tax exemptions will be granted and there will be "a system of freeing the movement of capital in order to attract more investment, a reform of credit operations, and technical help provided for agriculture and industry." This aspect of Portuguese policy is important. Dr Moreira at the same time as he announced the abolition of the indigenato system announced a policy for intensive settlement in Angola and Mozambique. Nor did Portugal intend to abandon "its policy of multi-racial integration without which there will be neither peace nor civilization in Black Africa."

What then did the reforms really do? The indigenato has been abolished and a qualitative franchise introduced. But 99 per cent of the African population will not have the vote, the only advantage perhaps will be that forced labour will no longer be permitted. But in Portuguese law there is no forced labour, only a voluntary contract freely entered into. The Minister for Overseas Provinces was anxious to stress that the reforms were not the result of events in Angola, but merely the culmination of her policy. He wanted it to "be clearly understood that the Portuguese people are subject to a political law which is the same for everyone without distinction of race, religion or culture."

This is exactly what the Africans object to. They do not want reforms, but want to end once for all the hated colonial system. They are familiar with the Portuguese paper plans. As *The Economist* pointed out, "These statements suggest that the fine words leave Dr Salazar's government as it was committed to a policy of white supremacy as the only means of maintaining its rule."

Measures were also taken to minimise the hardships of the settlers. First, a decentralisation of administration was carried out. Second, the Bank of Angola was authorised to grant a loan of 150 million escudos to the Coffee Board which was to enable the latter to purchase at a specially high price all the coffee that the planters were able to produce. Third, a Board for the development of the agricultural and pastoral industries was created and a sum of 150 million escudos placed at its disposal. The Governor was authorised to borrow 500 million escudos for urgent expenses. The Portuguese Government, moreover, decided to give a loan of 1,200 escudos to the Government of Angola, and a part of it—120 million—has already been placed at the disposal of Angola.

These measures won Salazar the support of the settlers. The settlers are now determined to maintain Salazar in power; increased local powers would mean that the settlers can now get the administration to supply them with labour. Settler opposition is really a struggle to share with the plantations the cheap labour of Angola. Now that Salazar has been forced to alter his plans, they will become his most ardent supporters.

Salazar had solved the political problem; the solution to the economic problem eluded him. The war created an acute economic crisis in Portugal. By September—by which time Salazar had promised to *restore order—confidence* had not returned. The capital outflow from Angola continued. The share index figure of overseas concerns, according to *The Financial Times*, fell to 41 (1952=100). The 900 escudos share of the Companhia Angolana de Agricul-

tura which had touched 7,000 escudos in 1955, declined to 1,300 by May and in July to 1,100 escudos. This company had a profit of 28 million escudos in 1951, and 29 million escudos in 1960, and had paid a dividend of 136 escudos in 1959 and 68 escudos in 1960. The 1,500 escudos share of Açucar de Angola, fluctuated between 1,300 and 930 escudos. From 29 million escudos in 1959, its profit fell to 26 million. It, however, maintained its dividends at 5.3 per cent. The value of the 500 escudos share of the Sociedade Agricola do Cassequel fetched 1,016 escudos in early 1961, but by the end of August it was selling at 650 escudos. It maintained its profits at 29 million escudos, paid its usual 11.2 per cent dividend.

Thus though the companies maintained their dividends, public confidence has not returned. Moreover, the financial situation became extremely difficult. Portugal had budgetted £21 million for civil and military defence during 1961; the emergency in Angola increased the defence budget by £6,750,000. The gold and dollar reserves, during the first three months of the campaign, fell by 5 per cent. Salazar has been forced to increase the taxes and the cost of living has gone up.

Would the 15 families which rule Portugal, support Salazar in a modern colonial war, which might overthrow the regime? Or will they cut their losses and withdraw? This is a question the answer to which is of vital interest to the world.

ANGOLA AND UNITED NATIONS

ONE of the most useful services rendered by the United Nations is the constant watch it keeps on the progress of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The existence of the Commission on Trusteeship of the General Assembly has forced the colonial powers to reckon with world public opinion. No nation can with impunity continue to treat subject peoples in a brutal way. All colonial powers excepting Portugal, Spain and the Union of South Africa have acknowledged it a duty to supply information on the Non-Self-Governing Territories which they administer. The people in the colonies are aware that their cause will be upheld by groups whose opposition to colonialism is based on a deep understanding of the humiliations and sufferings which people have to undergo under colonial rule.

The members of the United Nations are largely ex-colonial territories. It was, therefore, not surprising that on 14 December 1960 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The declaration was sponsored by 43 Afro-Asian nations and had been adopted without a dissenting vote; there were however nine abstentions—the United States of America, France, the United

Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain, and the Union of South Africa. The declaration has been hailed as a landmark in the history of the United Nations.

The General Assembly declared that :

1. The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire; without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

The Declaration did not take Portugal by surprise. As early as 1950, she had realised with growing dismay that the protest against colonialism would increase in intensity. She had in 1951 taken a very simple measure, i.e. abolished the colonies. They became the Overseas Provinces of Portugal. This step deceived no one; the Overseas Provinces remained colonies, but the fiction served Portugal well. She maintains that her former colonies have juridically become parts of Portugal, and as such she does not have to submit any information to the Trusteeship Commission.

Portugal was admitted as a member in 1955. She has since then repeatedly refused to furnish any information on her colonies. The Afro-Asian members have consistently opposed this view, but till 1959 no concrete action was taken. In that year, the Assembly set up a committee to study the principles which should determine whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information on territories under Article 73 of the Charter. In 1960 the Afro-Asian nations again

took up the issue. Between 2 and 11 November the Commission on Trusteeship of the General Assembly debated the problem of Portuguese and Spanish Colonies. A draft resolution was introduced by eight Afro-Asian nations consisting of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Nepal and Nigeria to the effect that the General Assembly should press the Governments of Portugal and Spain to permit the native populations of their colonies the freedom to organise in a democratic fashion to facilitate their independence; and that it should be made obligatory for the Governments of Spain and Portugal to transmit information under Article 73, without further delay.

The Commission debated the issue for some days. Over fifty delegates spoke on the issue. On 12 November, the Commission declared that Portugal had the obligation to furnish information to the United Nations about her so-called Overseas Provinces. Portugal protested vigorously. She made it clear that the United Nations' resolution was an interference in her internal affairs. The Trusteeship Commission had heard this refrain before. The reaction of the more radical members of the Commission is apparent in a motion introduced by the delegate from Ukraine to expel Portugal and Spain from the United Nations. Fortunately, this was not accepted. It would have merely rid Portugal of her embarrassment. Secure in the knowledge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization affords her sufficient protection, she would have ignored the United Nations. Now, not only Portugal but also her friends have to face the fact that she is carrying out genocide in Angola. If the world had not

taken notice she would have exterminated the African population of Angola.

Portugal is now fully aware that the Afro-Asian delegates will not drop the issue. Salazar, in his address to the National Assembly on 30 November, declared that the people who expound the doctrine of Africa for the Africans want to remake history. He continued to talk of a nation consisting of many people extending from the western extremity of Europe to Timor. Salazar is sure that his European allies, France and Britain, will be loyal to him, but not the United States of America. On 7 December 1960 the Portuguese Ambassador to the United States called on the Secretary of State and made it clear that Portugal would not stand any interference in her African territories.

This was, however, not the end. The people of Angola, in February 1961, started their war of liberation. On 20 February, the Liberian delegate in a letter to the Security Council urged "immediate action" to prevent further deterioration in Angola. Soon a majority of the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations wrote to the President of the Security Council informing him of their support for the Liberian motion. The Portuguese delegate Vasco V. Garin in a letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 7 March, protested against the Liberian motion. He held that the "matter" was one "which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Government of Portugal, i.e. the maintenance of internal public order." This was the old story that the Overseas Provinces are not colonies but provinces of Portugal. It did not deceive any one.

On 14 March, the United Arab Republic, Liberia and Ceylon introduced a draft resolution asking for reforms in Angola for "due respect for human rights and fundamental freedom," and for the appointment of a subcommittee to inquire into the matter. On 15 March, the resolution was voted by the Security Council, but it failed to get the necessary votes. Even Portugal's friends did not support her; they merely abstained.

The next step taken by the Afro-Asian group was to get the three power resolution inscribed on the agenda for the General Assembly. By 20 March, most of the Afro-Asian nations had come out in its support. On 22 March, the Security Council met to decide the agenda for the General Assembly. The Japanese delegate argued that the Liberian request for discussion of the "Situation in Angola" should be included in the agenda and that it was appropriate for the Assembly to discuss the issue because (i) in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter it could discuss any matter falling within the Charter, (ii) the situation in Angola was endangering peace. The Portuguese delegate naturally opposed this on the grounds that (a) the Council had already discussed the matter, (b) the maintenance of law and order is an internal matter and any action by the United Nations would be an interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation and (c) there is "no violation of human rights in Angola."

Such a denial was too bare-faced for even her friends. They were as usual willing to abstain, but the Latin American republics did not; and the Liberian request was accepted. The General Assembly,

after debating the issue—a debate which was notable for the abstention of Portugal—adopted on 23 April, by 73 votes to 2 (Spain and the Union of South Africa) a resolution calling on Portugal to give urgent consideration to the institution of reforms aimed at implementing the Declaration which the Assembly had adopted in December 1961. The General Assembly also established a five-member sub-committee to study the situation in Angola, receive documents, conduct an inquiry, and finally report to the General Assembly.

The Portuguese Government, however, refused to yield. Garin in a letter to the President of the Security Council made it clear that his government considered the action of the General Assembly to be illegal, and as undue interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation.

On 6 June, the Security Council started the debate on the situation in Angola. The Afro-Asian members bitterly attacked Portugal; her friends, notably France and Britain, did not support her but merely abstained. Thus by nine votes to none, on 9 June, the Security Council adopted the following resolution:

1. *Reaffirms* General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and calls upon Portugal to act in accordance with the terms of that resolution;
2. *Requests* the sub-committee appointed in terms of the aforesaid General Assembly resolution to implement its mandate without delay;
3. *Calls upon* the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures and further to

extend every facility to the sub-committee to enable it to perform the task expeditiously;

4. *Expresses* the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. *Requests* the sub-committee to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as possible.

The sub-committee set about making enquiries and receiving documents. It had, however, not reckoned with its host. It sought facilities from the Portuguese Government to proceed to Angola to have a first-hand knowledge of the situation there. On 30 June, Salazar refused it permission. His reasons were that there was nothing wrong with Angola—a foreign inspired conspiracy had failed—the allegations were fantastic and were the work of a group inspired by international communism. Salazar, however, was willing to invite the Chairman, Dr Salamanca, though not the committee, to Lisbon. Portugal thus treated the United Nations with scorn and contempt.

What can the Afro-Asian nations do? Portugal has made it clear that she does not propose to implement the resolutions of the United Nations; passing of resolutions will, therefore, be meaningless. The method adopted to meet the Korean crisis, i.e. a resolution by the General Assembly “uniting for peace,” which led to military action seems to be the only solution. Angola calls for similar action. It is the only way to save the population of Angola from being exterminated by Salazar’s assassins.

MOZAMBIQUE

THE Portuguese entered the Mozambique channel in 1497. Soon they acquired some territory on the coast. They called their forts on the coast, "Mozambique"; but the colony as we know it today was formed only during the later part of the nineteenth century. It is slightly smaller than Angola in size and has an area of 771,325 km. It has, however, a larger population (5,730,930).

Situated on the east coast of Africa, it is mainly a tropical country, though the southernmost portion including Lourenço Marques is in the temperate zone. On the north it is bounded by Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia; on the west by Southern Rhodesia; on the south by Transvaal, Swaziland and Natal; and on the east by the Indian Ocean.

Mozambique has a total length of 1,250 miles from north to south, but its breadth varies from 56 miles to 718 miles. This is because Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia protrude into Mozambique, and their main outlets are the ports of Mozambique.

The country can be divided into three distinct areas: a coastal lowland, a middle plateau—with an average height of 1000 ft.—and a high plateau near the Rhodesian and Nyasa frontier. The territory, how-

ever, is divided into four administrative units. Sul do Save, with Lourenço Marques as its administrative capital in the extreme south; Manica and Sofala with Beira as their administrative headquarters; Zambesia with Quelimane as its capital; and Niassa with Nampula as its headquarters. Lourenço Marques in the far south is the capital of the country.

Mozambique is fortunate in having a large number of rivers. There is Rovuma in the far north, the Zambesi, Lingonha and Save in the middle. In the south there is the Limpopo and the Incomati. Apart from these there are a large number of small rivers and lakes. The result is that some areas, for example, the southern portion of the Sul do Save Province, have an extremely fertile soil. The coastal plain in that area is suitable for rice growing. The area between Limpopo and Save in the interior is an arid country. However, the central area, that is, the country north of Save, though fertile is underdeveloped because of the lack of communications. Apart from the southern portion, the district of Tete bordering Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and covering the Angoni plateau is one of the richest areas. Tete itself lying in the Zambesi valley is one of the hottest places in the colony, but the plateau which has an average height of 4,000 feet certainly ranks among the temperate areas of the continent. The rest of the country, particularly the north, is tropical, though the mountain slopes of Gurie and Melange are suitable for the cultivation of tea.

It will be clear from this that the areas of European settlement have been—the deep south, bordering on Natal and Transvaal and the Angoni plateau in the

north. It is in these areas that the majority of the 70,000 white settlers of Mozambique live. The Lourenço Marques district has the largest concentration of settlers, not only because it is the district in which the capital is situated, but also because the government has pursued an active policy of settling the immigrants there. The population problem is further complicated by the presence of Chinese and Indians: from Macao and Goa. The Indians from Gujarat and Cutch were prominent in trade but after India broke off diplomatic relations with Portugal they lost their position there. After the liberation of Goa, Portugal sequestered the properties of Indians in her Overseas Provinces and interned Indian citizens. The Goans, however, continue to hold a large number of administrative posts.

Mozambique is extremely rich in minerals, but no proper survey of the area has yet been carried out. In 1940 Mr T.C.F. Hall was appointed to carry out a geological survey. Among the minerals which are known to occur in Mozambique is gold—both in the area near Tete and in the Alto Lingonha, where a special concession has been granted to a British company. Tete district is also rich in copper. "There appears to be a definite copper belt in this area which could become of considerable economic importance to the country..."; geological explorations are, however, necessary to prove its existence. Apart from this, coal is being mined near Tete, and the Karrvo system which is found in South Africa has outcrops in many parts of Mozambique. The mining near Tete was undertaken by a Belgian company, the *Société Minière et Géologique du Zambeze*. Opera-

tions were facilitated because the Zambesi river provided an easy means of transport, but it was never on a large scale because the only two customers were the Trans-Zambezia Railway and the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. In 1949 the railway from Mutarara to Moatize where the coal is mined was completed. With direct connection between the pit-head and Beira it was decided to exploit the mines more intensively. A new company, Carbonifera de Moçambique, was, therefore, formed. The majority of shares, 60 per cent of the capital of Esc. (4,00,000,000,00) is Belgian, while 30 per cent is held by the Cia de Moçambique and 10 per cent by the Portuguese Government. It is estimated that the field has reserves of 400 million tons of coal. Apart from coal, iron both magnetite and hematite is found in the colony though at present it is not exploited. Among other minerals that have been found in the colony are lead, tungsten, chromium, tin, zircon and bauxite. The bauxite mine has a high aluminium content. It is owned by the Wankie Colliery Company, which in its turn is partly owned by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

The most important event in the recent economic history of Mozambique was the signing of an agreement in May 1948 between the Government of Portugal and the Gulf Oil Company. The oil company has thereby got a concession to prospect in the Sul do Save province, and to exploit it, if they are successful. They have an exclusive prospecting right in an area of 47,000 sq. miles stretching across the full breadth of the colony between 21°S and 25°S.

Apart from the mineral resources, Mozambique appears to have great potentialities for the develop-

ment of agriculture. These may properly be divided into two categories, those grown by the natives and those grown either by European farmers or on plantations. The crops grown by the natives, in turn, can be divided into two groups: subsistence crops grown for consumption locally, like manioc, bananas, beans, millet and others; and those grown by the Africans for selling in the open market, notably groundnut which has a ready market in Portugal. But, more important are the crops grown by the Africans but sold through a government organised monopoly. We have analysed this system in detail, and need mention here only those crops which the peasant in Mozambique is forced to cultivate. Of these, cotton is the most important. In 1926 comprehensive legislation was introduced for encouraging the cultivation of cotton. This was to plug the hole in the exchange reserves of Portugal; buying foreign grown cotton meant that she had to spend valuable foreign exchange. But the step did not help the exchequer to the extent anticipated and, in 1938, a Board for the export of cotton was formed. It was able to increase production by compelling the peasants to cultivate cotton; the result of this brutal measure was that the peasants did not grow any food crops and there was a severe famine. Portugal did not relent; she decreed that in addition to his usual food crops, the peasant had to plant an additional half an hectare of cotton. But this did not really solve the problem; food shortage continued to haunt Mozambique and famines were recurrent. In 1946, therefore, when the government automatically renewed all the concessions for another six years, it made it obligatory on the concessionaire to see that

the African maintained his normal rotation of crops. The concession holder was also to maintain health services for the Africans.

The system really meant that the African peasants were reduced to the position of serfs. They became dependent on the concession holder, who acquired complete control over their economic life. It was the concessionaire's duty to see that the peasants cultivated the crops; it was he who bought the cotton at prices fixed by the government. The system was not confined to cotton only; a similar system was introduced in 1941 for the cultivation of rice. This system is one of pure exploitation. The government fixes the price, the time and the place for the selling of the crop; the concessionaire has merely to buy the crop. The concessionaire is treated extremely well. He is forced to sell the cotton, after ginning it, to the State at a price which, though arrived at after consulting him, is really dictated by the State. It does, however, allow him a handsome margin of profit. Recently, Portugal has moved even further. She decided to make the African pay for all the improvements to be effected in the cultivation of cotton. A "Cotton Development Fund" has been started and the Africans are forced to contribute to this.

There would have been nothing wrong with this—indeed one would have called it an admirable measure—if the Africans benefited from it. Improved quality of cotton did not lead to higher prices; it merely meant that the State drew a bigger profit.

Mozambique is perhaps the finest rice growing territory in Africa. The river valleys are particularly suited for its cultivation. The Zambesi delta and the

district of Quelimane are the centres of paddy cultivation. A single concession covers "the whole of the Zambesi delta and the lower reaches of the Zambesi valley. . . ." The size of the concession can be seen by the fact that the delta itself covers an area of 2,500 sq. miles. The concession produces 20,000 tons of rice.

Apart from the concessions, the most important agricultural enterprises are those run by Europeans, and these range from bananas to wheat. Bananas are grown chiefly for the South African and Rhodesian markets. The largest banana plantation is owned by a Portuguese—M. C. Santiago of the Delagoa Plantations Limited. The Delagoa Plantations was a British company and it owned not only banana but also citrus plantations. During the war M. C. Santiago bought a majority share in the company. But though control of the Delagoa Plantations Ltd has become Anglo-Portuguese, the other large enterprises notably the great copra estates—*Companhia do Boror*, *Companhia do Zambezia*, *Sociedade Agricola do Madal*, and *Companhia Colonial de Angoche*—are all internationally financed. The *Boror Company* is financed by Germans; the *Sociedade do Madal* is French; and the *Sena Sugar Estates* is British. The *Companhia do Boror* for example has the largest coconut plantations in the world. These plantations are highly capitalised, and have their own narrow gauge railway systems, drying kilns, warehouses, etc. Sisal too—though on a smaller scale—is in the same position. There are a large number of highly capitalised firms formed with foreign participation.

Sisal is of growing importance in the economy of the territory. Recently, a factory has been started to

manufacture rope from sisal grown in Mozambique. Fourth in importance, following cotton, copra and sisal, is the sugar industry. The sugar industry, too, is highly capitalised, even more than the others; the total production being controlled by three companies: the Sena Sugar Estates Ltd, in the Zambezi valley; the Companhia Colonial do Buzi in the Buzi valley; and the Incomati Sugar Estates in the Incomati valley. British capital plays an important part in the sugar industry. Apart from these wheat growing and cattle ranching also contribute to the economy of the territory.

Till recently, there was hardly anything in the nature of an industry in Mozambique. The usual industries, which grow up in colonial areas—brush making, candle making, soap making—are there, but along with these some modern plants have come into existence. The three sugar estates naturally have factories to process the cane grown by them. The Incomati estate supplies a certain amount of molasses to the yeast factory in Lourenço Marques, and the Companhia Colonial de Buzi makes a limited quantity of alcohol. Other industries are two breweries, a cashew nut decorticating plant set up by a subsidiary of the Distillers Company of London, a cement factory started originally with South African capital, and later acquired by the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. A second cement factory has been started at Dondo near Beira. The Companhia das Jutas de Moçambique not only grows jute but also has a jute mill. The fibrous cement factory at Dondo is the largest plant of its kind in the Portuguese empire; the raw materials are imported, and the cement

comes from Portugal, but the factory manufactures irrigation pipes, bath tanks and other such articles.

Between 1955 and 1958, there was an increase in industrial activity. An iron and steel foundry, a factory for the manufacturing of starch from manioc, a jute and a paper mill, have come into existence. Thus one cannot say that Portugal has not attempted to develop the colony; but the development came only during the second six year plan and has been mainly the result of British, Belgian and South African investments.

It is, however, not on industries that Portugal bases her hopes. She sees Mozambique as a country of settlement; the immigrants from Portugal are to develop the agricultural resources of the territory. The need for organised immigration into Mozambique was realised by her when large numbers of poor peasants arrived in 1948. There were no plans for settling them. But by 1950 four separate zones had been demarcated for European settlement—the Incomati Valley, the Limpopo Valley, the Angonia and Niassa highlands and the territory from Beira to the Rhodesian frontier. During the two six year plans Portugal is making an attempt to develop these areas by bringing out settlers. Till 1953, however, it was Portuguese policy not to encourage settlement in Mozambique but in Angola. Mozambique's Europeans used to boast of their ancient connections with the land and their not having a "poor white" problem. This is no longer true. Of the 70,000 Europeans in Mozambique today most are recent immigrants. They are poor, illiterate peasants and are happy to go to the Union of South Africa as artisans or workers.

Today, while Mozambique still retains its old world charm—Lourenço Marques is the Nice of Africa—the new immigrants have introduced the “poor white” problem.

Portugal, however, hopes to settle a large white peasant community in Mozambique. The main colonization scheme is along the lower Limpopo and the Incomati rivers. The Limpopo Valley scheme has 50 miles of dikes and, 1,000 miles of feeder burrows. A large amount of money, estimated at over 30 million dollars, has already been spent; however, only 6,000 Portuguese farmers have been settled. The Portuguese object is to settle as many Europeans as possible in Mozambique in order to make it a white colony. They even hope to have a Portuguese settlement of over a million, within a reasonable time. Mozambique can certainly support a much larger population. Only 1 per cent of its area is under cultivation though 33 per cent of the total area is cultivable.

The second great project—Revue Hydro-electric—was completed in 1956. It is able to produce 45 million kwh. of electricity and supplies power to the textile mill in Vila Rey, to the cement factory at Dondo, and the fibro-cement plant. The Revue scheme is important, for it supplies electric power to Umtali and other Southern Rhodesian towns. The second stage of the scheme is being pursued and in 1960 an investment of £200,000 was made for that scheme.

The investments under the second six year plan emphasises the Portuguese policy of settlement, as well as closer relations with the Rhodesias and the

Union of South Africa. But, though Portugal emphasises the need for a close link with Rhodesia, it is Angola rather than Mozambique which got most of the money. This is because not only has Angola a larger white population, but the possibilities of white settlement there are much greater than in Mozambique.

This can be seen by the amount of money invested during the first six year plan, as also the utilisation of American aid. The Economic Cooperation Administration gave a credit of \$455 million for the period 1949-55; most of this money was spent in Angola. Mozambique, however, was visited by a large number of American officials. In 1952 the first six year plan was inaugurated; Mozambique got £40 million under it. Of this, the major items of expenditure were land settlement and irrigation as well as improvement in transport. The result of the plan was that it stimulated investment by foreign companies, for example, the Central Mining Investment Corporation of the Union of South Africa was given exclusive prospecting rights except for hydrocarbures and petroleum. The company, though South African, has its headquarters in London and its capital is British. There were many other concessions, as for example, the Ake Viking Lillas concession for iron ore and the Boliden concession.

In the second six year plan £40 million was voted by the Portuguese National Assembly for Mozambique. The major heads of expenditure are £9 million on irrigation and land settlement; £9 million on roads and £7½ million on railways, roads, airways and harbours. Most of the expenditure under this

head is on the Beira port and the highway linking Beira to the Rhodesian frontier. The importance which Portugal attaches to this scheme can be seen by the fact that in 1960, £2 million was allotted to it, while the Limpopo and Revue Colonisation schemes together got only £1,643,000.

The result was that there was a great increase in imports. But most of these were from countries other than Portugal. The economy, however, has not been buoyant. The balance of payment position worsened considerably; in 1960 the deficit was 37 million dollars, in 1956 it was 42 million dollars and in 1960 it reached 60 million dollars. Foreign exchange reserves as well as the gold reserves dropped, and there has been a continuous outflow of capital.

The situation in Angola, the riots in Rhodesia, and the recent independence of Tanganyika have also contributed to the uncertainty in Mozambique. Whatever Salazar might claim, international capital has been reluctant to enter Mozambique. Portugal lacks capital for investment. Moreover, it has not the technical and industrial skill to undertake the capital projects which some of the schemes necessitated. Thus foreign capital to a certain extent is satisfied that whatever projects the Portuguese government undertakes in its Overseas Provinces open competition will prevail. For example, most of the construction work connected with the projects have been carried out by foreign firms, the plant for the decortication of cashew nuts was put up by the de Smet Company of Antwerp; the starch plant at Inharime has been installed by German technicians and is equipped with German machinery. The machinery

and plant for the Fábrica de Cerveja da Beira Ltda were supplied from Britain, Germany and Belgium, while the compression, refrigeration and bottling plant came from the United States; the high tension wires for carrying power from Revue to Beira were supplied by the Italian firm 'Societa Anonima Elettificazione (S.A.E.) of Milan; the deep sea wharf and supplementary works at Port Amelia were carried out by the Danish firm Christian and Nielsen S. A. Ltd of the Union of South Africa.

The result has been that there is no single corporation dominant in Mozambique. Portugal has tried her best to overcome this by trying to get the American Petroleum companies interested, and though she has succeeded, the diplomacy of oil has been to conciliate the nationalist movements.

The most important single item in the economy of Mozambique is the selling of African labour by the Portuguese to the Governments of the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Transvaal had been getting her labour for a considerable time from Mozambique. From 1895, the Chamber of Mines of Transvaal has been sending recruiters to Mozambique, but from 1909 an official convention has regulated the recruiting of labour in Mozambique for the mines. Mozambique has been the backbone of the mining industry of South Africa and the Rhodesias. It is important to realise the significance of this trade. In return for the export of labour, South Africa guarantees 47½ per cent of the transit traffic destined for a specific zone. This zone is known as the "competitive area"—for all the Union ports and Lourenço Marques are in a position to compete for this trade. In return

for this the Union of South Africa gets 80,000 African labourers from south of latitude 22°S to work in the gold mines. This is the basic figure. An extra 10,000 is allowed to be recruited subject to an annual review. A recent calculation by an American author shows that southern Mozambique normally has 600,000 able-bodied workers, of which 400,000 are working in South Africa.

Labour recruiting is done by a single body—The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association which in addition to recruiting provides transport and looks after the worker till he reaches his destination. The usual period of contract is 12 months but it is usually extended for another six months.

The advantage which Portugal gets from this barter is significant. There is the indirect benefit which Lourenço Marques and the railway gets from the transit trade. Even more important is the direct benefit which the government derives. There is the passport fee of 10 sh. for every African native, there is a charge of 5 shillings for the renewal of contract, and a contract fee of 3 shillings per head per month. The first two are entirely paid by the African; 2 shillings out of the contract fee is also paid by him, while the employer contributes 1 shilling. After the ninth month, a portion of his salary is withheld, and is paid to him only when he returns to Mozambique. Thus Portugal earns valuable foreign exchange and also gets back the worker.

As Duffy points out, "The Mozambique-South African convention is an international projection of contract labour, and as such it is the step child of a centuries-old policy in Portuguese Africa which

stripped to its essentials has regarded the African as a working hand, call him slave, liberto, contratado, voluntario, or what you will."

This, however, is not the only way in which the Negro of Mozambique is exploited by the Portuguese. Portugal buys the colonial produce at a very low price. According to a South African writer,¹ "the prices are so low in relation to world prices that, to the colony, it means a considerable loss in exchange and export revenue." The author says that the colonies are expected to contribute low priced primary produce to keep the cost down for the consumer in Portugal. Yet, Portugal sells manufactured goods at prices which are very much higher than the world prices. Toilet soap, which is manufactured from raw materials supplied by the colonies at prices well below what prevails in the world market, is sold at an artificially inflated price. African producers of cotton in Moçambique are paid less than half the price which the same quality cotton fetches in neighbouring territories. It is ginned and baled to Portugal, at prices less than half the world market price, but when Portugal spins and weaves the cotton and sends it back as textile, the price is very much higher than the world market price. She is able to export her textiles only because of a law which forces an importer to get 75 per cent (value) of his requirements from Portugal.

The transport system is of great importance in understanding Portuguese policy. Mozambique has no properly coordinated system of transport; it is impossible to travel from the north of the colony to the south. But, the railway and highway systems of

¹ C.P. Spence, *Moçambique*.

Moçambique are integrated with that of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. To a certain extent, this is due to the fact that the British built the railways. The Trans-Zambezia, which is even today British-owned, enters from Nyasaland and joins the Beira Umtali line at Dondo. It was only in 1949 that the Portuguese Government bought the Beira Umtali line—the most important railway line in Moçambique—and in the same year the control of the Beira port reverted to them from the Beira Works Ltd. The Beira Umtali Railway runs from Beira on the coast to Umtali just inside Rhodesia. A third line of importance is the Lourenço Marques—Resani Garcia Railway which joins the South African system on the Transvaal border. A branch line goes to Xinavane. The Lourenço Marques Goba Railway goes up to the Swaziland frontier. The Limpopo Valley Railway has been built with two objectives in mind: one is to serve the Limpopo valley, and the other to extend it to the South Rhodesian frontier and thus provide a second outlet for Rhodesian exports. In 1955 the Limpopo Railway was inaugurated. This has meant that an additional 100,000 tons of freight finds its way to Lourenço Marques from Southern Rhodesia.

The most important recent railway construction is the Nacala-Lumbo-Cuamba line, which has opened up the entire north-central area. It serves some of the richest areas in the province. It is proposed to extend this line to Vila Cabral, and finally to link it up with the Nyasaland railway system. The Tete Railway has been extended to Moatize in order to exploit the coal mines there intensively. A new railway link between Beira and the Rhodesian frontier costing £12,500,000

is being built, and in 1962 two new quays will be ready at Beira which would handle the increased traffic from Rhodesia. Recently there has been a proposal to develop the iron ore deposits at Bonvu range in Swaziland. The scheme has been undertaken jointly by the Anglo-American Corporation and Guest Keen and Nettlefolds. The importance of the scheme for Mozambique is that Swaziland will be linked with the Portuguese railway system, and the export of iron ore to Japan will bring additional freight and hence additional revenue.

The railway lines show how closely the economy of Mozambique is linked with that of the British territories adjoining it. Only Tanganyika seems to have been left out and this as we shall see was done with a purpose.

The close link-up with Southern Rhodesia and the British can be seen in the convention of 17 June, 1950, which governs the future of the port of Beira and its railway. The Agreement is for a period of twenty years, and runs up to 1970, but there is a provision for revision in 1960. The Portuguese undertook to keep the port of Beira and the railway line in a state of efficiency and carry out certain developments in three stages. Portugal was able to implement the Beira Convention because of the funds the International Cooperation Administration placed at her disposal. She received 950,000 dollars as well as 4,250,000 Dutch florins for equipment for the mineral ore quay at Beira. The object of these developments is to increase the capacity of the port to 2½ million tons per year. The Portuguese agreed not to levy transit duties during the period of the Agreement. The other

governments, that is, Southern Rhodesia and Britain, agreed to prevent discrimination against traffic for which Beira is the natural outlet.

It is Angola rather than Mozambique which has come into the limelight now. The reasons for this are quite clear. The independence of the French Congo and of the Belgian Congo gave an impetus to the struggle for freedom. In Mozambique Portugal administers the territory, but it is Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa that control it. Moreover, Mozambique's hour of decision has not yet come. It is only now that Tanganyika is independent that Portuguese rule in Mozambique faces its final test.

We have already seen that Mozambique has an exposed frontier with Tanganyika. The Portuguese have deliberately kept the northern part of Mozambique without any means of communications with Tanganyika so as to reduce the movement of people to a minimum. But the happenings in Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia are not without effect on Mozambique; and if Nyasaland follows Tanganyika, not only the north but the whole of central Mozambique will be affected. Moreover, Portugal has only a small army in Mozambique—white soldiers do not number more than 10,000. There is an African army of 5,000. Thus an armed rising in Mozambique would force Portugal to seek South African and Rhodesian help. At present, Portugal, as we saw, has some sort of military arrangements with the Union about her defence. In any case, the interests of the Union in the Sul do Save province and Lourenço Marques are vital. The same is true of the

port of Beira, and the area between Beira and Umtali for Southern Rhodesia. Neither the Union nor Southern Rhodesia would, therefore, allow and would resist with all the means in their power any attempt to overthrow Portuguese rule in Mozambique. Munger, for example, believes that Mozambique will be partitioned between the Union, Rhodesia and Tanganyika, not by diplomatic negotiations but by the revolt of the Africans being countered by the troops from the settler countries moving in to restore "order."

If Angola is in flames, Mozambique is a powder keg with a lighted match lying near it. Lisbon realises this and, in May 1961, she replaced Governor Barros, an honest but inefficient man, by Admiral Sarmiento Rodrigues. Nor can Salazar hope that this régime will be supported by the settlers. In the 1958 elections H. Delgado received 67 per cent of the votes in Beira and a majority in every town except Lourenço Marques. The settler population in Mozambique has made it clear that they do not want any control from Lisbon, and like the settlers in Rhodesia, they would rather manage their own affairs. Besides, the settler newspaper, the *Nacion* of Captain Vaz, for example, has been conducting a bitter campaign against the Catholic Church. This is because the Church from 1957 onwards has changed its policy in Africa. Till then, its policy was to work long with the colonial governments, but realising even before Macmillan that the "wind of change" will sweep away the last vestige of colonialism in Africa, it began to put forward the right of Africans to be independent, and struggle for it in a non-violent

way. In Mozambique as in Angola the education of the African was entirely in the hands of the Church. Vaz accused the Church of utilising the funds placed at its disposal by the State for purposes other than the education of the natives. Vaz also pointed out that only recently has the Church accepted the idea of inspection of educational institutions by the government. Till now education according to him consisted of making the pupils undertake agricultural work. They were merely workers at the disposal of the members of the clergy.

The accusations made by Vaz are true, but the important point is that the colonial society in Mozambique has started showing deep fissures at this juncture. The settlers are at odds with the government in Lisbon; they are at odds with the missionaries. In April 1961, 1,500 people of Mozambique signed a letter and sent it to President Tomás demanding self-determination, a multi-racial state, free elections, and citizenship for the population irrespective of race. Two of the signatories of the letter, Carvalho and Barreto, were arrested and accused of inciting the populace to revolt. The government, however, proved willing to make some concessions to the settlers. They offered a pact permitting the Democratic Union to nominate two out of the six official candidates. The Democrats who are businessmen, and who had put up the manifesto demanding more liberal treatment for the settler and business community refused to accept this.

It is, however, not the settler element which will overthrow Portuguese rule. They want merely a delegation of power from Lisbon to Lourenço Mar-

ques. Their demand is for self-government, of government by people with local knowledge. The real challenge, however, comes from the Africans—not the Africans in Mozambique but the Negroes from Mozambique who have moved to Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. It is they who will overthrow Salazar. Dar-es-Salam is already regarded by the settler population in Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the Union, as the centre of all agitation against Portuguese rule in Mozambique.

Dar-es-Salam is in many ways admirably suited for this role. It is the only African-governed neighbour of Mozambique and there are already large numbers of refugees from Mozambique in Dar-es-Salam. These have been organized into two bodies—the Mozambique African National Union and The National Democratic Union. The NDU with Mr A.C. Gwambe as its President has Dar-es-Salam as its headquarters. It “welcomes all Mozambiquans to join with us in independence struggle for our mother land.”

A POLICY FOR INDIA

ANGOLA poses a moral problem for the world and India, in particular, cannot avoid facing the issue. Have a settler population, supported by a fascist government at home, the right to massacre the people of a colony? Can a State raise the plea of domestic jurisdiction against the intervention by the United Nations in a colonial territory by calling her colonies "Overseas Provinces"? Has Europe the right to rule over Africa? Is European civilization the only one in the world which the African must perforce adopt? These are questions which every State has to answer, but for us the choice is slightly more difficult. We, the people of India, have to decide whether the principle of non-violence which Mahatma Gandhi expounded and practised in order to win for India her independence is one of universal or of limited application. Our real problem in Angola is: can non-violence succeed against an enemy who has no moral scruples?

Indians are apt to equate their struggle for independence with the liberation movements elsewhere. But this is unfortunate. The principal object which Mahatma Gandhi had in mind was not the achievement of independence but the moral regeneration of the Indian people. He argued, rightly, that inde-

pendence could not be maintained if the people of India are not steeled by discipline. For one believing in ahimsa and non-violence, the discipline could only be a self-imposed one; a discipline which will not breakdown in the face of the most brutal oppression by the government.

The non-violent campaign needs for its success an opponent who is willing to debate, to listen to reason, and finally be guided by self-interest. A dictator like Hitler who is ready to annihilate a whole race would not ever be influenced by non-violence. He would most probably have found new victims for feeding the sacrificial fires of Fascism—the gas chambers. A non-violent passive resistance movement by the Jews in Germany would have been to Hitler a justification, if he required one, for annihilating them. Can anyone say that Salazar and Verwoerd are better than Hitler?

The great advantage which the Asian nationalist movements had was that they struggled against countries which were democracies. France and Britain, though they differ in many respects, are similar in one—public opinion there is able to influence policy. For example, recently, the whole question of British responsibilities in Nyasaland and the correctness of Britain's action in forcing it into a Federation against its will became a major issue. Dr Banda was able to use the Church of Scotland to voice his grievances. Similarly, Kaunda is able to discuss the racial policies of Welensky not only with the British Government, but also with the opposition and leaders of public opinion. In France too, the demand for independence by the colonies has been consistently supported by

public opinion. The French intellectuals whether of the Left as Sartre or of the Right as Mauriac have raised their voices against the atrocities in Algeria. It has in a way become a common struggle of the people of Algeria and of France to get rid of the settler influence on politics. The very fact that de Gaulle is negotiating with the Provisional Government of Algeria in the face of opposition from the army and the settlers shows that public opinion will prevail in the long run.

India was thus in a fortunate position. It dealt with a democracy which was forced by public opinion at home to maintain certain standards. There could be a Jallianwalla Bagh but considerable numbers of Englishmen felt that General O'Dwyer had disgraced England. O'Dwyer was forced into retirement by a government which was unsympathetic to Indian aspirations. There was, moreover, in India a Legislative Assembly where Indians could criticise any aspect of the government's policy which they did not like. There was an Indian press which though not wholly free was certainly not a controlled one, and could continuously criticise the Government.

The British Government in India was a foreign government but it was not a fascist government. Large sections of British opinion could be influenced by India. The nationalist movement was, therefore, in a position to function as a constitutional opposition, and could attempt to win independence without an armed struggle.

Is this the position in Angola or Mozambique? We have seen that the natives of Angola and Mozambique do not have any rights at all. They are not

of Salazar by the Iberian pact. Thus the Portuguese opposition has no chance of carrying out any clandestine activity against the present Government. The only opposition groups are in Brazil and they, as we saw, are hardly effective.

Nor must one forget that Portugal is controlled by the notorious secret police "Policia International da Defesa do Estado" the PIDE but this is an extremely inefficient body. The communist party of Portugal has been able to bring out its papers for the last thirty years without the police discovering the whereabouts of the printing press. If there is a real danger to the State, the PIDE would not be of any use in countering it. It is, however, sufficiently strong to brutalise and tyrannise the impoverished and illiterate peasantry of Portugal and her Overseas Provinces. The Portuguese have not the means to overthrow this tyranny—only a crushing defeat in Angola could do it. It is, therefore, really in the interest of the Portuguese people themselves that Angola's war of liberation should succeed; otherwise they will not be able to enjoy any liberty.

What has been the policy that India has pursued? India, of course, is opposed to colonialism and to Portuguese colonialism in particular. For fourteen years we were patiently trying to persuade the Portuguese to follow the examples set by Britain and France. This was because as a member of the United Nations we believe that disputes between Nations should be settled not by force but by negotiations. Negotiations, however, mean that the other party is willing to consider issues as negotiable. Portugal has consistently held the view that Goa was a part of

Portugal. The supporters of Portugal as well as her opponents were agreed in believing that India's failure to take action in Goa was closely connected with Portugal's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They argued that India has been unduly influenced by the statement of Dulles that he and the United States consider Goa to be a part of Portugal and as such covered by the NATO. Her patience and willingness to negotiate were misunderstood. There was therefore no alternative for India except to use force.

Nor has India ever abjured the use of force. The government of India has made this aspect of its policy crystal clear. The Prime Minister has repeatedly asked the people of India to become defence conscious; the Indian defence forces are certainly not trained to resist aggression by non-violent methods. Non-violence has not been adopted as the principle of India's defence policy. On Goa, Mr Nehru had declared that India would use all the means and methods at her disposal to reach a peaceful solution, but, if these did not succeed, the call to arms was not excluded.

India was not only right in using force but she indeed had a moral obligation to liberate Goa. The liberation of Goa is vital to the anti-colonial struggle in Africa. If we believe that colonialism is immoral, then the liberation of our fellow countrymen by force can be compared to a surgical operation to remove an extraneous growth. But in Goa, we not only helped thousands of our fellow countrymen to become free but let millions of Africans struggling against Portuguese colonialism know that we are with them.

Nor is this all. The people of Goa could not carry on a constitutional struggle. Delegate after delegate pointed out at the Seminar on Portuguese Colonies held in New Delhi in 1961 that in Portugal, as well as in Portuguese colonies, there is no method by which a constitutional struggle could be carried out. In Angola, according to reports, 30,000 were killed and over 50,000 were exiled. The total population of Angola is only 4.5 million, but the fighting in the early days was confined to the two northern provinces whose population is less than a million. Thus by July 1961 one-tenth of the population of these provinces had been affected. A non-violent struggle, against an enemy which uses napalm bombs, and bombers to strafe and kill women and children—could this be justified on moral grounds? The object which Salazar has in mind, as we saw, is the total extermination of the African population of Angola. Are the people of Angola to co-operate in this by allowing themselves to be led like sheep to the slaughter-house? The Jews and the gas chambers, the Angolan and the napalm bomb—is non-violence a weapon which can be used against a people without a moral law?

The liberation of Goa is merely the first step. India, with her first-hand knowledge of Portuguese oppression has an obligation to help the African colonies. She is in a position to do so.

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